

# **A chain of trust and power**

Studying the interrelation between trust and power in a spatial planning project.

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This thesis is written as the final assignment for the master Landscape Architecture and Planning, specialization Spatial Planning at Wageningen University.

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## **ABSTRACT**

In an increasing complex and dynamic society the communicative planning approach received much attention. To understand how this approach can properly function, social interactions need to be understood. To do so this study focuses on understanding how the interrelation between trust and power influences the evolution of a planning process. This is done with the help of the trust/power-triangle which is established in this study. It resulted in the understanding that the conceptual distinction between trust and power provides a distorted view on how both concepts can be viewed, for trust has properties of power and vice versa. This interdependence between trust and power makes it difficult to describe both concepts as separate entities and questions the apparent vulnerable position of trustors as described in literature. Furthermore does the interrelation between trust and power form a constant influence on a planning process, in a way that the perception of past experiences alters current trust/power dynamics and these current trust/power dynamics form a selection mechanism to establish a desired reality, or discourse, for the future. So decision making, or social interaction in general, is a source and a result of trust/power-dynamics at the same time.

**Keywords:** personal trust, system trust, power, interaction, interrelation, spatial planning, communicative planning

## PREFACE

The topic of this thesis appeared to be quiet straightforward to study. Just find out how trust operates in a planning process, how power operates and try to understand how they interact. Already after a couple of weeks it became apparent that these subjects were rather complex. The longer I tried to understand the concepts of trust and power the more difficult they seemed to get. New permutations were found as well as several relating concepts. Finally this resulted in the understanding that the answer to the research questions had be built on simplicity rather than complexity. Throughout this process I learned about structuring, abstraction and social interaction which will be helpful throughout my career.

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## SUMMARY

This study is about finding and understanding relational aspects between trust and power in a spatial planning process. The relevancy to study this interrelation originates from an increasingly complex society and the protests towards expert-formulated plans (Day and Gunton 2006). This resulted in a new planning approach in which communicative planning received much attention (Allmendinger 2009, p. 220). As social interactions form a relevant aspect in planning, and especially in communicative planning, it is relevant to study how these interactions work (Gunton and Day 2003 and Allmendinger 2009). Two mechanisms which relate to social interactions are trust and power. Both concepts are studied in relation to spatial planning by authors like Eshuis (2006), Stein and Harper (2003) for trust and Das and Teng (1998) and Flyvbjerg (2002) for power. However none of these studies explains particularly what the dynamic between both concepts is in spatial planning processes. Although De Vries (2008) and Stein and Harper (2003) indicate the relevance thereof. To gain an understanding of social interactions in planning this study focuses on understanding relational aspects between trust and power in a spatial planning process.

In this study a conceptual framework is formed about trust and power and its supposed relational aspects. This framework is based on several descriptions that were found about trust and power and its supposed interaction. Nooteboom (2002) described trust as a trustor who chooses to assume that a trustee doesn't take advantage of his vulnerability resulting from his one-sided pre-commitment. It was described as well that based on the image we have of the past a certain amount of trust can be expected in the future (Eshuis 2006) and this image of the past is dynamic (Mosch and Verhoeven 2003) which can influence the level of trust. Two forms of trust are considered in this study: personal trust and system trust. Weber (1978) described power as "...the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability rests". Giddens and Sutton (2009) described power as "... the ability of individuals or groups to make their own concerns or interests count, even where others resist. Power sometimes involves the direct use of force, but is almost always also accompanied by the development of ideas (ideology) which justify the actions of the powerful". Power in this study is represented in the form of power-effects. Together system trust, personal trust and power-effects form a conceptual framework, in the form of the so-called trust/power-triangle, to explain the trust and power dynamics in a planning process in this study.

The available literature about the relationship between trust and power is unclear and inconclusive (Das and Teng 1998). To understand this relationship on a deeper level a case is analyzed in this study. This case study concerns the Land-use Development Plan Rijssen (LDPR). This LDPR aims to improve 3800 hectares of rural land by adapting the land allocation for farmers and the development of nature. The analysis of the case study is structured with the help of the general phases of a planning process as described by Spit and Zoete (2006). The analysis itself is built on how personal trust, system trust and power-effects interact in the case.

The conclusion describes what knowledge is gained on how trust and power interact in a spatial planning process and how this interaction can be conceptualized. The following conclusions are made:

- The conceptual distinction between trust and power results in a distorted view of both concepts. Studying trust and power from a, still undefined, overarching conceptualization helps to provide a more accurate description of its functioning. The trust-power triangle, as defined in this study, forms a first attempt to do so;
- Stakeholders form a unique perspective towards the formulation of a problem definition based on past experiences. These perspectives cluster themselves around more general perspectives towards a project, which creates a situation wherein competing trust/power-dynamics compete to establish a prevalent reality or discourse. So defining a problem, or social interactions in general, are a result and form a source of trust/power dynamics. A planning process is thus under a constant influence of trust/power dynamics;
- The complexity of a planning process is related to the way trust and power interact in that process. The more complex a project the larger reliance on system trust and the larger presence of system authority;
- Personal trust, system trust and power-effects are interdependent. Those who exercise power are vulnerable for without trustors their power is non-existent. System trust thus has the ability in this to affect the exercise of power-effects and personal trust, but can be affected by those concepts as well;
- During periods without a noticeable trust/power dynamic a stakeholders perspective towards the project can change. This change is formed through the dynamic perception of stakeholders towards new influences and new knowledge in relation to the project;
- System trust can function as a way to manage expectations and uncertainties. System trust is however also a source of instability as system trust can be broken down to let outside influences enter the project, hereby affecting personal trust and power-effects that are exercised in the project;

Foregoing interactions make it possible to provide recommendations towards spatial planners. The general recommendation relates to the idea that an awareness of the influence that trust/power-dynamics can have on a project can help spatial planners to manage that project.

## SAMENVATTING

Deze studie gaat over het vinden en begrijpen van relationele aspecten tussen macht en vertrouwen in een ruimtelijk planning proces. De relevantie om deze interrelatie te bestuderen is afkomstig van de toenemende complexiteit in de samenleving en de protesten tegen plannen die puur door experts zijn geformuleerd (Day en Gunton 2006). Dit resulteerde in een nieuwe planningsbenadering waarin communicatieve planning relatief veel aandacht kreeg (Allmendinger 2009, p. 220). Aangezien sociale interacties een belangrijk aspect zijn van planning, en met name in communicatieve planning, is het relevant om te bestuderen hoe deze interacties werken (Gunton en Day 2003 en Allmendinger 2009). Twee sociale mechanismen die gerelateerd zijn aan sociale interactie zijn macht en vertrouwen. Beide concepten zijn bestudeerd in ruimtelijke planning door auteurs zoals Eshuis (2006), Stein en Harper (2003) voor vertrouwen en Das en Teng (1998), Flyvbjerg (2002) en Foucault (1994) voor macht. Geen van deze studies verklaart echter welke dynamiek er bestaat tussen macht en vertrouwen. Ook al geven Stein en Harper (2003) en De Vries (2008) de relevantie hiervoor aan. Om sociale interacties in ruimtelijke planning beter te begrijpen focust deze studie zich op het begrijpen van de relationele aspecten tussen macht en vertrouwen in een ruimtelijk planningsproject.

In deze studie is een conceptueel raamwerk geformuleerd over hoe de interrelatie tussen macht en vertrouwen bestudeerd kan worden. Dit raamwerk is gebaseerd op verschillende beschrijvingen die over macht en vertrouwen gevonden waren in het literatuur onderzoek. Nootboom (2002) beschrijft vertrouwens als een vertrouweling die aanneemt dat een vertrouwde gaan misbruik maakt van zijn eenzijdige verplichting naar deze persoon. Het was ook beschreven dat, gebaseerd op onze indruk van het verleden, we een bepaald vertrouwen stellen richting de toekomst (Eshuis 2006). Deze indruk van het verleden is dynamisch (Mosch en Verhoeven 2003). In deze studie worden twee vormen van vertrouwen beschreven: persoonlijk vertrouwen en vertrouwen in systemen.

Weber (1978) beschreef macht als de waarschijnlijkheid dat een bepaalde actor in een sociale relatie in een positie verkeerd om zijn zin door te drukken ondanks de aanwezige weerstand. Giddens en Sutton (2009) beschreven macht als het vermogen van individuen of groepen om hun interesse te doen tellen, zelfs wanneer anderen weerstand bieden. Macht heeft soms te maken met een dwingende uitoefening, maar gaat vaak gepaard met de ontwikkeling van ideeën of ideologieën die de acties van diegene met macht rechtvaardigen. Macht wordt in deze studie gerepresenteerd in de vorm van machts-effecten wat benadrukt dat macht geen eigenschap is die je kunt bezitten. Machts-effecten, persoonlijk vertrouwen en systeem vertrouwen vormen gezamenlijk de bouwstenen van de macht/vertrouwen-driehoek in deze studie, die gebruikt wordt om de interrelaties van beide concepten uit te leggen.

De conclusie van deze studie beschrijft welke kennis er vergaard is over de interrelatie tussen macht en vertrouwen in ruimtelijke planningsprocessen. De volgende conclusies zijn gemaakt:

- Het conceptuele onderscheid tussen macht en vertrouwen veroorzaakt een vervormd beeld betreffende beide concepten. Door macht en vertrouwen te bestuderen vanuit een, nog niet benoemd, overkoepelende conceptualisatie maakt het mogelijk de onderlinge functionaliteit van beide concepten beter te beschrijven. De macht/vertrouwen-driehoek van deze studie vormt hiervoor een eerste aanzet;

- Actoren in een planningsproces vormen elke een uniek perspectief jegens de formulering van een probleemdefinitie gebaseerd op eerdere ervaringen. Machtsinvloeden uit het verleden kunnen dus de huidige macht/vertrouwen dynamiek beïnvloeden;
- De complexiteit van een planningsproces is gerelateerd aan de manier waarop macht en vertrouwen met elkaar daarin relateren. Hoe complexer het project hoe groter de kans dat systeem vertrouwen deel uit maakt van de macht/vertrouwen interrelatie;
- Persoonlijk vertrouwen, systeem vertrouwen en machtseffecten zijn onderling afhankelijk. Diegene die macht uitoefenen zijn kwetsbaar want zonder het vertrouwen van vertrouwelingen bestaat hun macht niet. Systeem vertrouwen kan hierin de uitoefening van machtseffecten en persoonlijk vertrouwen beïnvloeden en andersom ook;
- Gedurende perioden zonder een duidelijk merkbare macht/vertrouwen dynamiek kan het perspectief van een actor richting het proces nog steeds veranderen. Deze verandering wordt gevormd door de dynamische interpretatie van actoren richting nieuwe ontwikkelingen en nieuwe kennis;
- Systeem vertrouwen kan functioneren als een bron van dynamische stabiliteit welke afgebroken kan worden om ontwikkelingen van buiten het project invloed te geven in het proces, wat natuurlijk zijn weerslag heeft op persoonlijk vertrouwen en machtseffecten in het project.

Voorgaande beschrijvingen van de interrelaties tussen macht en vertrouwen maakt het mogelijk om aanbevelingen te geven richting ruimtelijke planners. Een van deze aanbevelingen is dat er een bewustzijn moet zijn over hoe de grootte, en timing van beslissingen invloed kan uitoefenen op een project. Een te grote afhankelijkheid van systeem vertrouwen door actoren is hierbij niet wenselijk aangezien systeem vertrouwen dynamische eigenschappen heeft.

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## 1. Problem Description

A heading in a local newspaper stated: 'We can do better without the land allocation project' (De Twentsche Courant Tubantia undated, attachment 1). Next to the more obvious message that this article was about to elaborate on a conflict in a spatial planning project, it relates to the realm of social interactions that plays a role in this land allocation project as well. An example of these social interactions can be found in the following quotes from the newspaper article in which a contractor and the secretary of the land-use commission have an argument.

Contractor:

*"It is sad that healthy farms are heavily hurt by the land use commission. The land use commission is aware of the problems, but does not cooperate in any way."*

Secretary of the land use commission (in reaction to the contractor):

*"We have to obey the land use law; we have to take into account the whole community, not just the farmers."*

In the quotes above a contractor and the secretary of the land use commission have an argument about the land-allocation plan. An assumption about this argument can be that the contractor lost trust in the project, because of the lack of cooperation from the land-use commission. On the other hand, the secretary of the land use commission is in a position of power, supported by the land-use law and the 'whole community' to proceed the project in a certain direction. Apparently there is some form of dynamic which makes the secretary exercise power and the contractor to lose trust. The secretary feels the need to explain his actions, which indicates that the secretary can be influenced by the contractor as well. These social interactions in the land-use plan Enter can broadly be ranged under the definition of : 'Any form of social encounter by individuals' or groups as described by Giddens and Sutton (2009, p.1133). Merton (1968) described the elements of a social interaction as social mechanisms and defined them as 'social processes having designated consequences for designated parts of the social structure' (p. 43-44). Nothing new here, one could argue, as social interactions are intrinsically connected to spatial planning processes. However, there is a relevancy these days to study these dynamics of social interactions. To understand this it is necessary to shortly review the development of spatial planning from the 1950's and forward.

From roughly 1950 until 1990 the characteristics of a regular planning process were described as based on instrumental rationality. Planning was about a rational organization in which the steps of the process were structured beforehand (Leeuwis 2004). It was about systematically identifying, evaluating and choosing means in a technical and apolitical way (Allmendinger 2009). Those who worked in a public organization like planning had the responsibility to act single-minded towards goals and hereby discard personal inclinations and preferences (Allmendinger 2009, Friedmann 1987). It was typical in that time to assume that science and technological development lead to a complete knowledge of the world and the solution to all problems. A good example of this was the theory of Karl Popper. He developed a model where science acts like a net for reality. He argued that when scientific knowledge develops further the mazes of the net get smaller, until the whole truth is made clear by science (Schröder 2005).

There were however critics who pointed out weaknesses of this rational approach. This approach has for example a rationality to it which cannot be maintained in practice (Van Woerkum et al 2011). Stakeholders in a planning process were seen as static and their roles in the process determined before the process even started (Portugali 2008). The criticism on instrumental rationality was fueled by growing protests of stakeholders over expert formulated plans in areas such as urban renewal and natural resource management, that were contrary to the interests of large segments of society (Day and Gunton 2006). This led to frictions, as the values, wishes and stakes of involved actors were in fact dynamic and could change over time. Critics concluded that an adequate prediction of reality in a planning process, which is attempted in instrumental rationality, is close to impossible. It was argued that a planning process was too complex, too dynamic and too many variables were at play to predict a certain outcome of the process beforehand (Van Woerkum et al. 2011). These arguments were fueled by a perceived increasingly complex and dynamic society (Allmendinger 2009).

The critics on instrumental rationality became part of what is now known as the postmodern turn in spatial planning. The essence of this postmodern turn is that the plausibility of absolute ideas of right and wrong was questioned. It was argued that truth is socially constructed (Allmendinger 2009). A planning process was no longer seen as static and predictable, but as dynamic and unpredictable. The postmodern turn however led to new challenges. How can you for example make sense of a planning process when it is unpredictable? Several researchers came up with new planning approaches to deal with these issues. Participatory planning for example (Forester 2001), which focuses on participation of stakeholders in a spatial planning process. Or contingency planning (Andersen 2003) which focuses on analyzing risks, threads and scenarios to successfully guide a planning process to a desirable end result. Or planning in relation to chaos (Burnes 2005) which reviews spatial planning from the viewpoint of complexity theories. The planning approach of interactive decision received attention as well and gained increasing theoretical popularity (Allmendinger 2009 and Van Assche 2007). It gained political popularity as well which was exemplified in a statement of the parliament where it was said that: 'society is able to manage problems if the government gives space for society to act against these problem' (Dam et al. 2011). This change is also described as a shift from government towards governance (Kooiman 1993, Rhodes 1996). Habermas (1985) argued that a communicative rationality, where the approach of interactive decision making is part of, 'involves breaking down the dominance of scientific objectivism and building instead a different kind of objectivity based on agreement between individuals reached through free and open discourse' (Allmendinger 2009, p.200).

Edelenbos and Klijn (2005) described this communicative rationality in relation to planning as 'a way of conducting policies whereby a government involves its citizens, social organizations, enterprises and other stakeholders in the early stages of the policy-making process'. He described as well that communicative planning 'is an open decision procedure; it tries to incorporate the wishes of various involved actors in the solutions that are developed during the interactive process' (Edelenbos and Klijn 2005). Or to put it differently, communicative planning is about mutually creating agreement, whereby stakeholders have the possibility to influence the planning process. The possibility for stakeholders to influence this process is specifically important in this study. It is argued that this possibility to interact has its influence on trust and power dynamics in the planning process; the topic of this study. Of course it can be questioned if communicative planning is the right way forward, because: 'To accept communicative planning you must accept its foundations of planning as a redistributive activity, of planners as more than

apolitical arbiters between different interests and, most importantly, of planning as a participative process' (Allmendinger 2009, p. 220). This involved a radical break with the perception of planners and even questions the whole basis of a 'planning profession' – how can you have a profession if there is no such thing as expert knowledge, only different opinions one can bring together? (Allmendinger 2009). Though, the idea of communicative planning somehow caught on and this form of planning is focused upon in this study.

Social interactions form a relevant aspect in communicative planning, as this planning approach aims to bring different opinions together (Allmendinger 2009) which indicates a relevancy to study social interactions in this day and age. However, social interactions take place in all spatial planning processes. This can be explained if we visualize the spectrum of spatial planning processes with the help of the participation ladder as described by Arnstein (1969). This ladder describes different positions a stakeholder can have in a planning process. The lowest spot on the participation ladder is called manipulation and represents the lowest amount of participation in a project. Planners on this spot of the ladder are merely trying to convince stakeholders of the plans these same planners already developed (Arnstein 1969). As 'convincing' can only take place when there is an information exchange between the planner and the stakeholders, one can see that, even at the lowest spot of participation, a social interaction between planner and stakeholder is going on. The desire of a planner to manipulate, in this case, means social interactions are present. So social interactions are part of all spatial planning processes. It provides clarity on how these processes work and how these processes can be managed. The necessity for this can for example be derived from the idea that the communicative planning approach involved a loss of power for planners by challenging their expert status and dominant discourses (Allmendinger 2009). This new planning approach also raised new questions like: 'How do new ways of thinking get generated and shared amongst a complex polity?' and 'What generates creative thinking and the construction of new discourses with the power to command conviction among the many parties?' (Healey 1998, p.10). By studying social interactions clarity can be gained on what role spatial planners can have in a communicative planning process and how such a process can be managed.

There is a multitude of social mechanisms which 'manage' social interactions. Trust as well as power are two of them. Both are regarded as important social mechanisms which are part of social processes as described by Bachmann (2001). The concepts of trust (Van Ark 2005; Edelenbos & Klijn 2007; Eshuis 2006; Stein and Harper 2003; De Vries 2008) and power (Flyvbjerg 2002; Stein and Harper 2003; Das and Teng 1998) have been studied in relation to spatial planning, hereby already indicating a relevance to study these concepts. None of these studies however specifically focuses on the interaction between trust and power in a spatial planning process, however De Vries (2008) and Stein and Harper (2003) indicate a relevancy to do so. Following from this relevancy this study concerns the interrelationship between trust and power.

There are several authors who already indicate relationships between trust and power. Bachmann (2001) mentioned for example that most social relations are based on a mixture of trust and power. Dasgupta (1988) described trust and power from an economical perspective. Das and Teng (1998) described trust and power (or rather 'control' in this case) from the perspective of partner cooperation. Other researchers like Inkpen and Currall (1997) and Leifer and Mills (1996) studied trust and power on a side note as described in the literature review of this study. An example of trust and power influencing a social interaction is given by Verkerk

(2004) as he describes: ‘..I experienced the effects of low-trust and powerlessness on my own body. It resulted in an undercurrent of fear, feelings of insecurity, a lot of stress, and periods in which problems were threats instead of challenges’ (p.377).

So, social mechanisms influence a communicative planning process, or, more generally speaking, a spatial planning process. Though both mechanisms often go unnoticed for their elusive character. Foucault describes this issue in relation to power when he states that: ‘Power is invisible and ‘flows’ through the complex web of networks that make up modern life’ (Painter 1995 quoted from Allmendinger 2009, p.9). This invisibility makes it more difficult to study social mechanisms as its functioning cannot be discovered at the surface level of society. However, by deriving the functioning and characteristics of social mechanisms from a spatial planning process it is possible to study the relationship trust and power. An understanding of this interrelation helps to put the current knowledge of trust and power into a new perspective and provides a possibility to understand social interactions and the way these interactions influence a planning process. Since trust and power are both important social mechanisms as already mentioned by Bachmann (2001) and there is an increased attention for the communicative aspects of planning related to a lack of knowledge on how this affects the position of a spatial planner, and the process itself, it is relevant to study the relation between both concepts and how they affect a planning process.

### **1.1 Research Objective**

To study the interrelation between trust and power the following research objective is defined for this study:

*“To gain inside in how the dynamic interrelations between trust and power influence the evolution of a planning process.”*

### **1.2 Research Questions**

The main research question relating to the research objective is:

*“How does the interrelation between trust and power influence the evolution of a spatial planning process?”*

To understand how trust and power interrelate there has to be clarity on how trust and power can be conceptualized, how this conceptualization influences the perception of a planning process, for a new perspective on trust and power might influence the way we perceive its functioning in planning, and how functioning of this conceptualization influences a planning process. To achieve this the following three sub-questions are answered in this study:

*“How can the interrelation between trust and power in a planning project be conceptualized?”*

*“How does this conceptualization influence the perception of a planning process?”*

*“How does this conceptualization influence a planning process?”*

### **1.3 Reading Guide**

This chapter gave an introduction to the research problem and the related research questions. In chapter two the research design of this study is presented which explains the research methods to answer the research questions. Chapter three presents a literature review concerning the concepts of trust and power and its interrelation. This chapter ends with a conceptual framework to analyze the case study. Chapter four concerns a description of the case-study. Chapter 5 analysis the case-study and in chapter six, the final chapter, the conclusions and recommendations of this study are presented.

## **2. Research design**

To provide an answer for the research questions a case study is conducted to explore how the concepts of trust and power interact throughout a spatial planning process. To analyze how trust and power operate in the case study, it first was necessary to conduct a literature study and expert interviews. How and why this was done is described below.

### **2.1 Literature study and expert interviews**

The aim of the literature study is to provide a background on the concepts of trust and power, describe how they interrelate and provide a framework to conceptualize this interaction. Before the literature study was carried out a quick-scan was made to get an impression of the available information. This quick-scan indicated an apparent lack of literature regarding trust and power and especially about its interrelation in spatial planning. Therefore literature related to the planning domain, like social sciences, organizational sciences and marketing is added to the literature study as well.

To provide a better perspective on how to understand or frame trust and power in spatial planning, six expert interviews were conducted. These expert interviews were carried out in cooperation with the organization Mediation MRO. This organization offers its services when there is a conflict between parties in urban planning or the environmental domain. In an acquaintance conversation with the organization, it became clear that the issue of trust and power plays an important role in resolving a conflict between stakeholders. Six experts originating from disciplines like judicial, government and business were interviewed with the questions described in appendix two. The interview questions were semi-structured to provide flexibility in the exploration of trust/power dynamics.

### **2.2 Case study selection**

The objective of the case study was to provide the possibility to study the interaction and development of trust and power throughout a planning process. The case study concerns the Land-use Development Plan located in the municipality of Rijssen-Holten in The Netherlands. In the remainder of the study this is referred to as the LDPR. This particular case was chosen for several reasons. The start of the LDPR project in 1983 is one of the reasons as the length of the project makes it possible to trace back several trust/power dynamics and the development of these dynamics over time. Next to this it is likely that the nature of the project, the re-allocation of lands, triggers strong emotional responses from involved farmers as their business and personal lives are heavily involved. This makes it more likely that dynamics of trust and power are traceable. Lastly the presence of a shifting organization and shifting project goals in the LDPR offers the possibility to describe its influence on the trust/power dynamics.

The case study is carried out by doing six semi-structured interviews and a document study. As it is uncertain beforehand what questions will receive a valuable answer in relation to trust and power the interviews are semi-structured. The questions for the case-study are derived from the literature review. The interviewees were selected by their representativeness for representing farmers, municipal government and nature organizations. In appendix 3 the research questions for the case-study are stated. Next to the interviews local and provincial policies are scanned and

a short document study was carried out. Newspaper articles from the local paper 'De Twentsche Courant Tubantia' are used to get a view on the development of the project over time. Several policy papers, development plans and documents are used to provide additional information about the case.

### **2.3 Case study analysis and conclusion**

The case study is analyzed with the help of four 'tools' to describe the dynamics of trust and power. First of all there is an overarching context from which the case study is viewed relating to time and context as described below. Secondly the general steps of a planning process are defined to provide a chronological structure for the case study analysis as described below. Thirdly a conceptual framework is constructed, under the name of the trust/power-triangle, which helps to describe the interactions between trust and power as displayed at the end of the literature review. Lastly four related concepts to trust and power are described, which are: risk, responsibility, authority and control mechanisms, which helps to understand the trust/power interrelation. These related concepts are described at the end of the literature review as well. Together the literature study, expert interviews, case study and analysis provide the information to answer the research questions of this study in chapter six.

#### **2.3.1 Time and context**

When studying rational planning processes from the past it becomes clear that the context of the project, and its dynamics, are often not taken into consideration. 'The centralist planner was perceived to be insensitive to cultural, historical, landscape, ecological contexts, and this led to monolithic, unfriendly, undemocratic plans' (Van Assche 2007, p. 21). However with the postmodern turn, as described in the introduction, the notion that truth is socially constructed became prevalent. This implies that the perception of 'the truth' from a stakeholder in a planning process can be influenced by its environment. This influenced perception, in turn, can enter the planning process. It can be argued that the influence of stakeholders by its environment, or through context and time, forms a more central role communicative planning than it did in the period focused on instrumental rationality. This makes it relevant to understand that time and context can have an influence on trust/power dynamics inside a project. Unfortunately context, just as trust and power, is a vague concept. Bal (2002) mentions that the concept of context is defined in a multitude of ways and there is no single explanation possible about what context is. Eco (1976) goes even as far as stating that, in the end, everything is context and the universal encyclopaedia of the world. Nevertheless it is clear that experiences of the past can have a certain influence on future behaviour. So context can be influential over time. This image of the past is influenced by beliefs, knowledge, memory and interpretation of past experiences (De Vos 2011); also referred to as reflexiveness in sociology (Sztompka 1999). This image of the past is dynamic, it changes over time as we have different experiences including new opportunities or uncertainties (Mosch and Verhoeven 2003). This changing interpretation of past events by stakeholders, of course, influences current trust/power dynamics in a project, and thus forms a relevant variable in understanding trust/power interrelations.

#### **2.3.2 General elements of a planning process**

To describe the development of trust/power dynamics in a structured way in the case study four general elements of a planning process are distilled in this paragraph. These elements are not

always easily recognizable, in fact, they take place at the same time, are cyclic and iterative. As these elements provide a constructive overview of the planning process and can form a reference for the case study, these elements are summed up below. Different researchers use different descriptions, however there is considered to be a general structure in a planning process as described by Spit and Zoete (2006). The elements below are an adaption of the general structure from Spit and Zoete as to prevent overlapping analysis later on in this study.

- **Problem definition.** In this first step of the planning process, it is determined if there is a problem, what the problem is and an analysis of the problem;
- **Goal setting.** Based on the problem analysis goals can be defined. Although goal setting is a largely political issue, the frame for the goal setting is defined by specific aspects of the context of the project. For example financial, juridical, communicational and administrative procedures, as well as time planning, stakeholder definition and the forming of the executional process;
- **Measures / instrument generation.** In this phase a first draft of a certain measure or instrument is created. In a cyclic planning process this draft is often adapted as the first draft raises new issues in relation to the problem definition and the goal setting. This phase ends often with for example a policy document which forms the basis for implementation;
- **Implementation.** When the policy document is accepted the implementation of the plan can start. This step is about the organization of the process towards implementation of the desired changes. Financial aspects, regulations, stakeholders and elements of the process need to be arranged at the appropriate time in this final phase.

#### 2.4 Limitations of the research design

This study is built around a single case study, but Flyvbjerg (2006) mentioned that: 'you cannot generalize from a single case, some would say, and social science is about generalizing' (p.219). Similarly Kuhn mentioned that a discipline without a large number of thoroughly executed case studies is a discipline without a systematic production of exemplars, and that a discipline without exemplars is an ineffective one. In social science, like spatial planning, a greater number of good case studies could help remedy this situation (Kuhn 1987). Though Abercrombie, Hill and Turner (1984) described a single case study as follow: 'The detailed examination of a single example of a class of phenomena, a case study cannot provide reliable information about the broader class, but it may be useful in the preliminary stages of an investigation since it provides hypothesis, which may be tested systematically with a larger number of cases' (Abercrombie, Hill and Turner 1984, p.34). Flyvbjerg studied the phenomenon of a single case study. He concluded: 'One can often generalize on the basis of a single case, and the case study may be central to scientific development via generalization as supplement or alternative to other methods' (Flyvbjerg 2006, p.228). According to this statement a single case study conducted for an explorative research, what this study is, is justified.

Another limitation of this study is that retrieving information from planning practice has to deal with, as Giddens (1984) called it, double hermeneutics. This concept refers to the idea that for

example the interviewer and interviewee have different perceptions. Emans (2002) found three places in an interview where a bias can have its inception to influence the end result. The bias can be found in the interpretation of a question by the one interviewed, in the perception of the answer by the one who is conducting the interview and based on the situation the interview is held in (Emans 2002). The interview results of this study are reviewed by the interviewees to prevent inconsistencies and wrong interpretations.

### **3. Literature review**

This chapter describes the concepts of trust and power and its interrelation based on a review of literature concerning these topics. An understanding of these concepts helps to analyse the case study which is presented in the next chapter.

#### **3.1 The concept of trust**

Trust is a subject studied in a variety of disciplines like philosophy, economics, psychology, political science and religion. Despite this multiplicity of angles there are general characteristics attributed to trust which appear to remain uniform throughout all disciplines. One of these characteristics is described by Luhmann (1979) as he examined the complexity of society by studying trust. He argued that trust is formed through interaction between social actors. In this interaction one social actor, the trustor, chooses to trust another social actor, the trustee. This trustor assumes that the trustee will behave in a specific positive way, now as well as in the future. So, trust can be viewed as a specific positive assumption from one social actor towards another formed through interaction.

This positive assumption requires a leap of faith according to Kumar and Paddison (2000) from the trustors point of view. Nooteboom (2002) relates to this as he describes trust from a perspective of vulnerability. A trustor is seen as someone who is prepared to take actions and make decisions which are favourable to a trustee. This preparedness takes place under the condition of limited knowledge; it is unclear for a trustor how the trustee will behave in the future. The trustor has limited insight into the motives of the trustee. Consequently a trustor is seen as making himself vulnerable to a trustee. This means that a trustor has a one-sided pre-commitment to the trustee without the guarantee that the trustee will honour this pre-commitment. This, however, does not imply that a trustee is likely to dishonour a trustor as he for example has a reputation which can be damaged.

Nevertheless it can be argued that the vulnerability of a trustor implies that he needs to bear a certain risk. Bachmann (2002) relates the concept of risk and trust in more depth. He argues that trust deals with the problem of predicting another social actor's future behaviour. As this future behaviour can not accurately be predicted, the trustor relies on risk taking regarding future situations. So trusting someone is related to risk taking. Currall and Inkpen (2002) agree with this statement as they say: 'at any level of trust, a certain level of relational risk is present as a partner may not act according to agreement' (Ireland and Webb 2006, p.484). Other researchers state similarly that as we have an incomplete knowledge of a trustees motives, trust always involves elements of uncertainty and risk (De Vos 2011, Hosmer 1995, Johnson-George and Swap 1982, Kee and Knox 1970 and Deutsch 1962). In addition to this Bachmann (2002) argues that it is legitimate and most likely that a potential trustor will seek possibilities to reduce the risk he needs to bear when investing in trust. This argument appears reasonable as the reduction of risk increases predictability and reduces uncertainty from the perspective of a trustor.

An aspect related to risk taking and trust is the determination of the trustworthiness of a trustee. Eshuis (2006), amongst others, argues that a part of the determination of trustworthiness is influenced by past experiences. He argues that the image we have of the past translates to the amount of trust we can have in the future. De Vos (2011) argues that this image of the past is influenced by beliefs, knowledge, memory and interpretation of past experiences. This implies that our image of the past is not static. As we for example gain new experiences our

interpretation and perspective on the past changes. Mosch and Verhoeven (2003) state that our image of the past is dynamic, it changes over time as we have different experiences including new opportunities or uncertainties. A bad experience in the past with a certain stakeholder, for example, can be neutralized by a recent good experience with this stakeholder. In this case the old experience does not disappear, but is rationalized as having less relevancy for the current situation. Consequently our interpretation of past experiences, at least partly, influences our interpretation of someone's trustworthiness.

To shortly summarize, trust is formed through social interaction between social actors. Trust is viewed as a specific positive assumption towards another social actors future behaviour. Trust involves uncertainty and risk taking from the trustor's points of view and a trustor deals with the desire to reduce the risks he needs to bear when investing in trust. Trustworthiness is, at least partly, determined on basis of our dynamic interpretation of past experiences, future expectations and present day events.

Above general characteristics give a diffused overview of what trust is. For example the statement from Bachmann (2002) that it is legitimate and most likely that a potential trustor will seek possibilities to reduce the risk he needs to bear contradicts, to a certain extent, with the idea of Luhmann (1979) that a trustor has a specific positive assumption about a trustee. The contradiction lies in the idea that a trustor wants to avoid a dependency on a trustee and at the same time has a specific positive assumption about the future behaviour of that same trustee. Possibly because of this seemingly complex interpretation of trust, researchers categorized trust in different forms, which are described below.

Julsrud (2008) for example described the complementary forms of passive and active trust. Passive trust is viewed as a stable autonomous form of trust which requires no specific effort to sustain. Julsrud (2008) argues that passive trust can be found when people take part in everyday actions and situations and perform their role as expected. Passive trust is closely related to the concept of confidence. Luhmann (1988) described confidence as when one does not consider alternatives. Deutsch (1958) sees confidence as the assumption from an individual that a certain event he desires will occur instead of an event he fears. Active trust can be viewed as the opposite of passive trust. Active trust implies a continuous and conscious effort to achieve a trusting relationship. Julsrud (2008) says: 'Active trust implies a reflexive process which requires that it be constantly produced in order to result in a stable or at least continuous relationship' (quoted in De Vos 2011 p.5). An example of passive trust is leaving your wallet with a friend, unconsciously assuming that he won't steal it. An example of active trust is found in the continuous effort in a planning process to sustain trustworthy relationships in a dynamic environment. Batt and Purchase (2004) try to distinguish active and passive trust. They see passive trust as giving a relationship a stabilizing force; no effort is required to sustain this form of trust. Active trust is seen as a form of trust which constantly needs to be produced in order to sustain. So trust can be defined in passive and active trust. Passive trust is an effortless and stabilizing force, while active trust a continuous conscious effort to stabilize a trustworthy relationship.

Another spectrum of trust ranges from thick to thin trust. Thick trust is argued to be found in solid personal relationships. Thick, in this case, refers to intimate personal relations as in between close friends and family. De Vos (2011) argues that this form of trust is commonly accompanied by a reference to pre-modern society. Misztal (1996) reasons this argument as he

states that in social relationships based on thick trust there is a willingness to reciprocate, as the relations have a sense of dependency and the possible loss of reputation. As in our current society there is a relative small dependence needed on others, thin trust thrives increasingly in modern society (Newton 1997). It is argued that thin trust involves a larger number of acquaintances than thick trust and the relationships are considered less dense (Anheier and Kendall 2002). In a certain sense thin trust is more fragile as it is depending less on others as is the case in thick trust. So, thick trust is seen as relying on a willingness to reciprocate and a sense of dependency, while thin trust does this to a lesser extent, which results in less dense relationships.

Another conceptualization of trust ranges from personal to system trust. Personal trust is created between two or more persons. In complex cooperation's this form of trust is often seen as ineffective, as it is based on personal contact and takes a long time to develop (Ebers 1997). Though it is argued that, because of decentralization in capitalistic economies, this form of trust has regained importance in many social contexts (Lane and Bachmann 1998). System trust, on the other hand, regards the preparedness of an individual or group to have trust in abstract systems. System trust is about our willingness to rely on standards, procedures, norms and for example policies. In a planning process there can be system trust in for example 'the government' or 'the municipality'. So personal trust is formed between persons and is based on personal contact, while system trust regards the preparedness to trust in systems.

These ranges of trust conceptualizations provides the possibility to distinguish different forms of trust, however this multitude of conceptualizations overlap each other as well. When a person for example has trust in the municipality it can be argued, according to the conceptualizations, that he has system trust, thin trust as well as passive trust. System trust, in this case, can be seen as a form of passive trust, as its principles are not questioned and it is assumed that the system provides satisfactory results. System and passive trust are related to thin trust as both forms of trust do not require the formation of an intimate personal relation. So someone who trust in a 'municipality', can have trust in an abstract system, based on a small personal connection and formed in an effortless manner. Likewise it can be argued that a relationship between someone who trusts a person constitutes of personal, thick and active trust. Personal trust relates to thick trust as it is formed through personal relations and can result in a willingness to reciprocate and a sense of dependency. Active trust relates to personal trust and thick trust as it continuously and consciously needs to be produced in order to sustain. So trust is described based on different conceptualizations which can be formed into two groups as described above.

In the previous paragraphs it is argued that trust can be seen as a relational concept formed through interaction between persons and systems which generally involves uncertainty and risk taking from a trustors point of view. Two groups of trust can be distinguished based on system/thin/passive trust, which is further referred to as system trust and personal/thick/active trust, which is further referred to as personal trust. The question for this study remains how trust interrelates with power in planning processes, so first the concept of power needs to be discussed.

### 3.2 The concept of power

Researchers interpret the concept of power in different ways, though it is unclear what power exactly is and how it functions in social processes (Dhillon 2004). It can be said that power, just as trust, is a social mechanism that is present during co-operation between parties. In this mechanism one stakeholder selects specific assumptions about the future behaviour of another stakeholder (Bachmann 2002). Power can be used, as well as trust, to 'reduce the level of uncertainty by increasing the predictability of satisfactory cooperative behaviour' (Das and Teng 1998, p.492). Luhmann described power as: 'Influencing the selection of actions in the face of other possibilities' (1978, p.112). Weber (1978) assumed a similar stance and portrayed power as the ability to carry out one's will even when faced with resistance. Giddens and Sutton described power similarly, but added that: 'Power sometimes involves the direct use of force, but is almost always accompanied by the development of ideas (ideology) which justify the actions of the powerful' (2009, p.1128). From the above descriptions, power can be viewed as formed through interaction between social actors. One social actor has the ability to carry out his ideas despite resistance. Interestingly, it is argued that an exercise of power is often justified by other social actors. So power is not only about carrying out one's will, but is also related to a justification of the exercised power, Weber called this authority (Giddens 2009). He argued that power can be used with force or violence. Authority, by contrast, is dependent on the acceptance by subordinates of the right of those people above them to give them orders or directives (Giddens and Sutton 2009). Interestingly authority is not only established through acting trustworthy throughout time. Weber described three different forms of authority:

- **Charismatic authority.** Charismatic authority comes down to having inspirational qualities, which are capable of capturing imagination and devotion of followers. According to Weber's formulation political and religious figures can have a charismatic authority.
- **Traditional authority.** Traditional authority can be described as power which is legitimized through respected long-established patterns. Weber gives the example of hereditary families in medieval Europe.
- **Rational-legal authority.** Rational-legal authority can be described as power legitimized by legally enacted rules and regulations. According to Weber this form of authority is found in modern organizations and bureaucracies. Weber argues that rational-legal authority is increasingly replacing traditional and charismatic authority.

All three forms can have their place in a planning process. An actor can exercise charismatic authority by being enthusiastic and passionate about a project. An actor can exercise traditional authority by his expected power legitimation developed through time. A spatial planner can for example exercise traditional authority because of the excellent quality of his long standing profession. Rational-legal authority can have its place in a planning process, by obeying a certain law for example.

In contrast to Weber's more formal definition of power, the French sociologist Michel Foucault developed the idea that power is found at all levels of society and social existence. He argues that power is invisible and 'flows' through the complex web of networks that make up modern

life (Allmendinger 2009). In other words, power can be found at all levels of social interaction, in all social institutions and in all people. He argued that this power often works through discourse.

Discourse can be defined as a collectively produced reality, which is perceived to be true by a certain group of people, who hereby reject other collectively produced realities. Hereby indicating that power, and its ability to influence the selection of action, can define a reality (Flyvbjerg 2002).

It can be concluded that power has an elusive character, shapes interaction and can be found at all levels of social existence. A social actor can be seen as powerful when he carries out his will despite resistance (Weber 1978) which affects a social process. However, this does not mean that power is carried out through sheer force, but is often times based on a certain justification for the powerful and formed in discourses. The next paragraph describes relational aspects between trust and power.

### **3.3 Interaction between trust and power**


Bachmann (2002) describes that personal trust can break down quickly, institutional trust can fade away in periods of crisis (Kern 1998) or can fail for example during large-scale technological disasters like Chernobyl. That is why trust is not the only mechanism to guide social interactions. Bachmann, as stated before, argued that most social relationships are based on a mixture of trust and power. Since both social mechanisms have limited abilities to cope with the dynamics of social interactions, a combination of trust and power is often the only way to ensure a good co-ordination of social interactions (Bachmann 2001). This statement is supported by Stein and Harper (2003). They argue that the Foucauldian view that power is the co-extensive in every relationship in social interactions is incomplete. Power cannot be the only determining factor in social interaction. They argue that relations in which only power plays a role does not generate any communication. 'The very possibility of truth, understanding, knowledge or learning would be ruled out' (Stein and Harper 2003, p.136). There is another vocabulary of equal importance, but given less importance in planning theory which is trust (Stein and Harper 2003). They relate to Wittgenstein (1969) when they argue that: '..trust is at least as basic as power, to understanding human relationships and institutions and to reforming them. Trust is also a necessary condition for any kind of communication, understanding, knowledge or learning. If there were literally no trust, then nothing any other party says could be accepted; everything would have to be verified, guaranteed or enforced' (p. 135).

Other literature provides bits of knowledge about the relationship between trust and power. There is for example the assumption that 'the more there is of trust, the less there is of power and vice versa' (Inkpen and Currall 1997, Leifer and Mills 1996). This statement is seemingly contradicted by Bachmann (2002) and Zucker (1986) as they argue that a high level of system power can cause a high level of trust. Though both arguments are valid when put in the right perspective. The statement that 'the more there is of trust, the less there is of power and vice versa' fits in the perspective of personal trust. As there is a high level of trust arguably little power is needed to achieve satisfactory cooperation between social actors. According to Fox (1974) this is only possible in the presence of shared values (Verkerk 2004, p. 99). The statement that a high level of system power can cause a high level of trust fits in the perspective of system trust. Although these statements help to form an idea about the functioning of trust and power, the relationship between trust and power remains unclear and inconclusive (Das and Teng 1998). Also these statements fail to indicate that trust, power and its relation are dynamic as they are

formed through interaction. As interaction per definition is dynamic, a static view of trust and power only provides a limited understanding on how trust and power interact and how this interaction changes over time. A good example of an author who provided a static insight into the functioning of trust and power is Verkerk (2004). He simplified the possible relations between trust and power in a matrix and studied its implications. His power-trust matrix simplifies reality into four possible combinations of trust and power. It fails however to include the different forms of trust and power that exist, as described in the previous paragraph, even as its dynamic, so the relations between trust and power are more complex than this matrix suggests. The matrix however helps to form an insight into the dynamics of trust and power. Verkerk (2004) argues that a situation of low-trust and high-power is unstable and likely to dissolve in a situation of low-trust and low-power. He argues as well that a situation of high-trust and low-power is likely to dissolve in a situation of low-trust and low-power as well. From these observations of Verkerk it can be argued that trust and power have a certain interdependence. He argued that high-power cannot be maintained when there is low-trust. Without the support of a trustor, a trustee cannot maintain his position of power. It appears to be uncommon, according to this matrix, that the levels of trust and power are too far 'separated' from each other. Though it remains unclear yet if this is the case outside the simplified reality of the trust/power matrix.

### 3.4 Focus for the case study

This chapter described certain characteristics of trust, power and its relationship. Trust indicates a one-sided pre-commitment towards a trustee which relates trust to the concepts of, amongst others, uncertainty, risk taking and vulnerability. Whereby trust can be seen as a relation concept formed through interaction between persons and systems. Power indicates the ability 'to influence the selection of action in the face of other possibilities' (Luhmann 1979, p.112). Whereby power often relates to authority, in the form of a justification from trustors towards the exercised power. Power can be found at all levels of society and manifests itself through socially constructed discourses, which create realities. The studied literature indicates an interdependence between trust and power (Verkerk 2004, Bachmann 2002 and Zucker 1986), though it remains unclear how trust and power interrelate throughout a planning process. To study this interrelation a conceptual framework is established below. This framework makes it possible to analyze how trust and power interact throughout a planning process. In the previous paragraphs an overview and interpretation of available literature on the relationship between trust and power is displayed. In order to study the relation between trust and power in a structured way a conceptual framework is needed. The conceptual framework that is presented below consists of three related elements which arguably present the cornerstones of trust/power dynamics in a spatial planning process.



(Fig.1 trust/power triangle)

The triangle consists of personal trust, system trust and power-effects. All three elements can be found in a planning process. Personal trust relates to system trust in a sense that system trust provides a framework in which personal trust is developed. If system trust is viewed as a relative given, than this provides a basis on which personal trust can develop. System trust relates to power-effects in a way that its functioning can be altered by power-effects. Power-effects relate to personal trust as these power-effects can affect the personal trust a social actor is experiencing. Each element of the triangle is a dynamic concept which is formed through interaction, whereby each element fluctuates through time and context, which, in effect, can influence other elements of the triangle. The functionality of this trust/power-triangle can for example be found by reviewing the British and German socio-economic system, which was done by Bachmann in 2002.

One of the characters of the British socio-economic system is the relative lack of regulating mechanisms to guide social actors' interactions; the British system largely relies on personal trust. The German system, on the other hand, is often described as guided by governmental regulating mechanisms which allow for longer term cooperation in business relationships (Stewart et al. 1994, Lane 1995, Lane and Bachmann 1996, Bachmann and Lane 1997) so the German socio-economic system relies on system trust. The German socio-economic system is characterized by regulations and a strong institutional order. 'German businessman trust each other as representatives of their organizations which are embedded in highly regulated socio-economic systems, rather than as a more or less sympathetic and potentially dangerously idiosyncratic individuals who merely by accident represent firm A instead of firm B' (p.27). 'The German system illustrates that power can appear as a condition of, rather than an alternative to trust, but it is most important to note that the form of power which is concerned here is not personal power but system power which is anonymous and is carried out through the structures of hierarchy and the authority of institutions' (Bachmann 2001, p.358). So the power-effects in the German socio-economic system constitutes of a high level of regulations and organization to which trust is assigned by social actors in the form of system trust. In this environment the development of personal trust is not necessary to achieve satisfactory cooperation. The British socio-economic system, on the other hand has trust based on individual experiences (personal trust) instead of system trust in an institutional framework. 'As system trust, however, is not produced in sufficient quantity in the British system, due to the lack of collectively binding norms and standards of business behavior, it is not surprising to see that, under these conditions, businessmen are more inclined to consider their individual resources of power to control the dynamics of their relationships instead of trust' (Bachmann 2002, p.354). So in the British socio-economic system a reliance on personal trust is used. As there is lack of binding norms it can be considered that a reliance on personal power-effects is preferred to control the risk and uncertainty from the dynamics in social interactions.

This example of the British and German socio-economic system illustrates that two different 'approaches' towards trust and power can function in a social situation or planning process. It shows that two different 'approaches' from different countries can fit in the frame of the trust/power triangle. The focus of each of the two 'approaches' lies on different aspects of the triangle. This illustrates that the trust/power triangle can capture the dynamics and fluctuations from different trust/power constructions and can be applied to the case study to understand its interrelations. The conceptual framework helps to understand which elements form the cornerstones in a trust/power dynamic and offers the opportunity to describe a change of these dynamics over time. To understand the functioning of this framework more clearly, operational

concepts related to the interaction between trust and power need to be described as is done in the following paragraph.

### **3.5 Concepts related to the interaction between trust and power**

To analyze the interrelation between trust and power, it is helpful to describe concepts which relate to trust and power. Below concepts are already hinted at in the previous paragraphs. A description of these concepts helps to understand how interrelations in the trust/power triangle take place and develop.

- Risk

Trust involves elements of risk, as stated before (De Vos 2011, Hosmer 1995, Johnson- George & Swap 1982, Deutsch 1962, Kee & Knox 1970). It was argued that a trustor is dependent on the power of a trustee to act according to agreement, which involves risk taking from the trustors point of view. It can be argued that risk is involved as a relational aspect between trust and power as well. The following quote from Currall and Inkpenn (2002, p.4840) illustrates this: 'at any level of trust, a certain amount of relational risk is present as a partner may not act according to agreement' (quoted in Ireland and Webb 2006, p.484). It becomes clear that if a trustee 'does not act according to agreement' a trustor needs to bear the consequences of his one-sided pre-commitment. The risk he needs to bear is on the mercy off the trustee, who has the power to honor or dishonor the implicit agreement between them two. With other words: a trustee has power over a trustor and this involves risk taking from the trustors point of view. This means that an, on the surface level illogical level of risk taking from a certain actor, indicates an underlying power/trust structure where a trustor has inadequate power to reduce his risks. This means that risk taking can be seen as a possible indicator of a certain trust/power-dynamic in a spatial planning process.

- Responsibility

Responsibility, and to a smaller extend authority (described in the next paragraph), are antagonistic to risk taking behavior. The virtue of someone in a power position to honor the risk taking behavior of a trustor, is a desired characteristic from the trustors point of view. From the person in a power position it can be expected to act responsible. Responsibility can be described as an expected positive commitment from the person in power towards the persons that put trust in him. As Giddens mentioned, power sometimes involves the direct use of force. Though, it is almost always accompanied by the development of ideas which justify the actions which are taken (Giddens and Sutton 2009). With other words, trust and power are bound to each other based on an expected responsibility of the powerful towards the powerless.

- Authority

Authority can be described from a different point of view. Authority can be seen as a perceived positive legitimization of a trustees power from the trustors point of view. Authority can be established by a trustee by acting trustworthy over a certain period of time. Authority is a perceived positive legitimization because our image of the past is dynamic and can change over time (Eshuis 2006). Giddens and Sutton (2009) described the difference between power and authority. Giddens and Sutton argued that power can be used with force or violence. Authority, by contrast, is dependent on the acceptance by subordinates of the right of those people above


them to give them orders or directives (Giddens and Sutton 2009). Depending on context and framing ones ascribed authority can be 'larger' or 'smaller'. Authority, just as trust and power, is an elusive possession. So one cannot have a small or large amount of authority.

- Control mechanisms

Control mechanisms play a role in spatial planning processes. A contract between two parties can be seen as a control mechanism for example. Though it must be said that there are different interpretations of control possible. This definition of control in this study is made by juxtaposing control and power. To start with power. As stated before, power is one's ability to influence the selection of actions in the face of other possibilities (Luhmann 1979, p. 112). With other words, the powerful have the ability to carry out their will despite resistance of the powerless. Next to this, as described before, power is perceived as being dynamic and an elusive property. Control on the other hand, although it can be initiated or changed by the powerful, is in essence static and it can distribute power. This gives the concept of control certain properties. A control mechanism can be seen as a system or regulation where two or more parties have agreed upon, or are forced to agree upon (when sheer power is into play instead of authority or responsibility). This control mechanism indicates, with a certain amount of pressure, what the desired behavior is of one or more of the actors. It indicates which rules, norms or standards must be followed and is boundary setting. There is a certain amount of obligation towards this control mechanism. It can be imagined that changing 'the rules of the game' by the powerful without a sufficient argumentation leads to a destruction of the power / trust structure. Whereby authority is reduced and trust is low. Possibly resulting 'in an undercurrent of fear, feelings of insecurity, a lot of stress, and periods in which problems were threats instead of challenges' as described by Verkerk (2004, p. 377). Nevertheless, control mechanisms reduce the uncertainty and increase the predictability of a planning process. It often limits (but not necessary) the power of the powerful, and increases predictability for those who put their trust in the powerful.

#### 4. Case study

The case study concerns the Land-use Development Plan Rijssen, which is referred to as the LDPR in the remainder of this study. The main aim of this plan is to improve the rural qualities of the project area. Originally the plan started out as a re-allocation plan for farmers, though gradually it included other subjects as well. The project area has a size of approximately 3800 hectares and is located in the municipalities of Rijssen-Holten, Hellendoorn, Wierden and Hof van Twente. Figure 2 displays a map of the project area (Dienst Landinrichting en Beheer Landbouwgronden in Overijssel 1996).



(Fig. 2 Project area Land-use Development Plan Rijssen)

One of the main land uses in the project area is agriculture. From a historical perspective farms were located on the slopes of the Holterberg (located north of Holten), the Borkeld (south of Rijssen), as well as on cultivated elevations close to the river Regge which lingers through Nijverdal and the northern part of the city Rijssen. On those hightened areas grains and other foodsources were produced. On the lower areas cattle was held which could feed itself of the available grasses. Aspects of this historical perspective are still recognizable in the area (DLG 2000), though the intensification and upscaling of farms, amongst others, has altered the project majorly and is causing subsequent problems as will be seen in the next paragraphs.

##### 4.1 Problems in the project area

Not only does intensified and upscaled farming cause problems in the area, these issues relate to water abstraction and nature fragmentation for example as well. In the paragraphs below the

major problems related to the LDPR-area are described. Some of these problems have reduced in size since they were described more than twenty years ago, though these problems form the basis on which the LDPR was originally build.

- The financial health and sustainability of farms is one of the major concerns in the project area. One of the reasons for this is that the current division of lands is unsatisfactory. Farmers tend to have too many plots located too far from their farms. This causes additional costs and prevents a profitable business. As upscaling and an optimized business are vital for a farms existence (Hidding et al. 2002) one can understand that a solution for this problem is desirable.
- Another problem related to farming in the project area is that manure toxics and pesticides cause water pollution. Especially as the sandy soils only bind a small portion of these polutions which results in groundwater contamination. An effect of this pollution has been noted in a decrease of natural qualities in the area especially in the aquatic flora and fauna.
- Next to this groundwater contamination there are other problems which cause a loss of natural quality. One of the most prominent is desiccation. Desiccation is caused by the deep ditches in the area which transports rainwater and seepage quickly towards the river Regge. On the other hand there are water abstractions in Holten, Nijverdal and Wierden which cause a drop in groundwater level. These two issues combined cause a visible desiccation in the area and a decrease of meadow birds (Dienst Landinrichting en Beheer Landbouwgronden in Overijssel 1996).
- Another problem related to natural qualities is caused by the large nature areas which surround the project. The exchange of fauna between the Holterberg, Elsenerveld, Wierdenseveld, Zunasche Heide and Reggedal is difficult because of artificial barriers like roads and railroad. This puts a pressure on the aesthetic qualities of the landscape and the visibility of the cultural history. This pressure is strengthened by agricultural developments, urban expansion and the development and broadening of roads in the area. The result is a fragmentation of the visible landscape types and elements. It resulted as well in a reduced potential for recreation and tourism in the area (Dienst Landinrichting en Beheer Landbouwgronden in Overijssel 1996). In 1983 it was decided to, initially, solve part of these problems through the development of the LDPR. A few years after goals were formulated which remained to form the basis behind the LDPR.

#### **4.2 Objectives of the LDPR**

The main objectives formulated in the pre-design of the LDPR remained basically unaltered throughout the project though influenced by different policies. The LDPR is for example part of the Reconstructionplan Salland-Twente (Provincie Overijssel 2004). The main goal of this reconstruction plan is to apply a zoning in the area in regard to intensive farming. The reconstruction plan tries to protect vulnerable soils and nature areas by re-allocating farms themselves. To this cause three zones are defined, each designed for a different form of farming. A general principle of the reconstruction plan is to re-allocate intensive farming from an 'extensive' to an 'intensive' zone. Another policy which partly determined the goals of the LDPR

is the Begrenzingsplan Rijssen which was set by the Province of Overijssel in 1995. It resulted in the formulation of the following objectives in the pre-draft of the LDPR:

- Sustainable and profitable agriculture through upscaling and improved work conditions;
- Improved environmental qualities concerning water and soil;
- Creating a part of the Ecological Headstructure and creating natural values which represent the area and its hydrological system;
- Improved liveability for inhabitants and users of the area;
- Improved opportunities for recreation combined with farming, nature and landscape;
- A recognizable landscape with its own character.

These objectives formed the basis to which the rest of the project would be build. Throughout several years the land-use commission, which is described in the following paragraph, distilled the above objectives which became the main focus in the LDPR.

#### **4.3 Organization of the LDPR**

Formally the college of Gedeputeerde Staten from the Province of Overijssel is the commissioner of the whole project. This is arranged according to the Landinrichtingwet, or land-allocation law. However the day to day execution of the project is formed by two commissions: the land-allocation commission and the soil commission. The land-allocation commission aims at the overall development of the plan and the administrative decisions. The land-allocation commission consists of:

- An independent chairman;
- 4 Members representing agriculture;
- 2 Members representing nature organizations;
- 3 Aldermen representing surrounding municipalities;
- 1 Representative for the waterboard Regge en Dinkel.

The soil commission is installed to execute the plans. The secretary of the commission is taken care of by Dienst Landelijk Gebied and the ministry of Economic Business, Farming and Innovation. Next to the two commissions and the secretary there is a project team of officials who advice both commissions which consists of:

- A representative from the Province of Overijssel;
- A representative from the municipality Wierden;
- A representative from the municipality Rijssen-Holten;
- A representative from the municipality Hellendoorn;
- A representative from the Dienst Landelijk Gebied;
- A representative from the Waterboard Regge en Dinkel;
- A representative from Het Kadaster.

In the remainder of this study this combination of commissions and the project team is generally referred to as the land-use commission.

The land-allocation law has a large influence on the organization of the LDPR. It describes the required composition of the commission and the rights and duties of stakeholders in the project.

It describes as well the general required processes in the LDPR (Landinrichting Rijssen 2012). The next paragraph describes the general process of the LDPR as it occurred over the last decades.

#### **4.4 Process of the LDPR**

This paragraph contains a chronological description of the LDPR. It all officially started in 1983 with a formal request for a land-allocation plan.

##### **1983 – Request Land-allocation plan**

In this year it became clear that the problems occurring in the ‘project area’ needed to be resolved. This resulted in the request for a land-allocation plan.

##### **1989 – Establishment of the land-use commission**

Throughout the last six years the situation in the project area was analysed and the request for a land-allocation plan approved. This resulted in the instalment of the land-use commission.

##### **1989 – 1996 - Pre-draft**

The land-use commission made a stocktaking of the bottlenecks and desires in the area which resulted in the pre-draft plan in 1996. This pre-draft plan was discussed with representatives and relevant stakeholders and resulted in more than 130 objections to this plan.

##### **1996 – 1999 Draft plan, voting and land-allocation plan**

Consequently the pre-draft plan resulted in a draft plan which received 47 objections. The draft plan was reconsidered and on 9 December 1999 there was a voting amongst all stakeholders to accept the adapted draft plan. 59,4 % Of the voters agreed, which represented 74,9% of the total project surface. With this voting the draft plan now became land-allocation plan which would form the executional basis for the remainder of the project.

##### **2005 – Expansion of the land-use commission**

In 2005 the Gedeputeerde Staten of the Province of Overijssel decided to add additional members to the land-use commission which originally constituted of seven members. It was decided that the following representatives would be added:

- An alderman of the municipality Wierden;
- An alderman of the municipality Hellendoorn;
- An alderman of the municipality Rijssen-Holten;
- A representative of the organization Nature and Environment Overijssel (Gedeputeerde Staten van Overijssel 2005).

##### **2000 – 2012 Implementation of the project**

Between the years 2000 and 2012 the largest part of the LDPR is implemented. A relevant aspect of this implementation lies in the division of the project in several sub-

projects. The land-use commission decided to distinguish five different modules which each would be carried out throughout the coming years. The modules consisted of the development of the Elsenerbeek; the creation of a new brook located west of Rijssen, the development of a bicycle path near the river Regge and three different reparcelling projects in the area called: Rectum, Notter-Zuna and Rijssen-West. The five modules were carried out in the following order:

- 1<sup>st</sup> Implementation module Rectum in November 2000;
- 2<sup>nd</sup> Implementation module Elsenerbeek and bicycle path Regge 2002;
- 1<sup>st</sup> Plan development concerning Notter-Zuna 2003;
- 3<sup>rd</sup> Implementation module design Elsenerbeek in November 2004;
- 4<sup>th</sup> Implementation module Notter-Zuna in November 2005;
- 5<sup>th</sup> Implementation module complement Elsenerbeek in July 2007;
- 6<sup>th</sup> Implementation module Rijssen-West in December 2009;
- 2<sup>nd</sup> Plan adaption Rijssen-West in December 2010 (Province of Overijssel 2011).

The implemented modules of the reparcelling projects have a specific process of their own which is partly arranged through the land-allocation law. The process of the sub-project Rijssen-West is described below. The reparcelling projects of Notter-Zuna and Rectum have had similar processes.

#### 2010 - Statement of desires

Involved stakeholders stated their desires about their preferred parcel distribution.

#### 2010 – 2011 Creation of the Plan of Allocation

The Plan of Allocation describes the first proposition for the reparcelling.

#### 2011 – Public inspection of the Plan of Allocation

In May 2011 the Plan of Allocation of Rijssen-West was made public.

#### 2011 – 2012 Objection procedure

In 2011 and 2012 there was an objection procedure. Through this procedure stakeholders could once again state their desires. Following on this was a so-called 'process in silence' in which a new proposal for land distribution was made. Towards the end of 2012 the adapted Plan of Allocation is set.

#### 2013 – Parcel transition

The actual parcel transition in the area Rijssen-West will take place.

#### Unknown date – List of Monetary Arrangements

The final step in the LDPR is the List of Monetary Arrangements. For every stakeholder it is made public what amount of relative profit he received from the reparcelling. This profit is calculated and the difference in comparison to the situation before the re-allocation has to be paid.

## **5. Analysis of the case study**

The chapter concerning the literature study ended by explaining that interrelations between trust and power can be represented with the help of the so-called trust/power triangle. This triangle helps to provide a structured view on the dynamics of trust and power in a planning process on which the existing literature only provided a fragmented insight. The triangle consists of three concepts: personal trust, system trust and power-effects. It is argued that each of the concepts interacts with both of the others in a spatial planning process. In this chapter the triangle is applied to gain a further understanding on how these concepts interact over time in a specific planning project.

This chapter has a chronological structure based on several events which occurred in the case study. The paragraph titles are based on the general elements of a spatial planning process as described in the research design. In this chapter only the relevant analytical points regarding the case and the trust/power triangle are displayed. The interview results of the case study are enclosed in this chapter to achieve a coherent story.

### **5.1 Inception of trust and power in the problem definition phase**

The literature review described four general phases of a planning process. These phases are an adaptation of the original from Spit and Zoete (2006). According to this classification the first phase of a planning process concerns the problem definition. On first glance this appears to imply that the problem definition phase starts out as a tabula rasa; events that occurred before the problem definition have no influence on the current state of the project. In this study it is argued that a problem definition is always connected to a certain context and can thus never be a tabula rasa. In other words: a series of events in the past, or a context, triggered certain stakeholders to develop a problem definition which brought the LDPR in existence. On a similar note, it is possible that the current levels of trust and power in the project are derived from the contextual influences that brought this project into existence, thus linking the fluctuations of trust and power before and during the project to each other.

In the LDPR the first problem definition of the project was formed back in 1983. The problem definition was derived from the necessity of local farmers to regain financial sustainability as indicated by one of the interviewees. This need was formed through globalization of the world market which led to scaling, intensification and specialization of farms (Hidding et al. 2002 and CBS, PBL and Wageningen UR 2009). Consequently the lack of financial sustainability for farmers in the project area was the cause for the creation of the first problem definition back in 1983 (Landinrichtingscommissie Rijssen 2000). In other words: context, in this case the financial situation of farmers, was a condition for creating the first problem definition. This formation of a problem definition shines some light on the start of trust-power structures in the project. Power came into existence by the fact that stakeholders put forth a first problem definition. The effect of this exercise of power was that it opened up the possibility for other stakeholders to support this problem definition and thus to support, or form trust, towards this perspective. So the commencement of the problem definition created a new context of relations and perspectives, revolving around the problem definition, where trust and power found its place.

However this does not mean that only one 'reality' was created in relation to this new context of relations and perspectives. Rather it can be argued that each of the stakeholders formed a unique perspective towards this problem definition. As for each of the stakeholders has a unique set of circumstances and interpretations for his or her personal situation. Including for example their own financial sustainability or their own dynamic interpretation of past experiences as described previously by De Vries (2009). One of the farmers for example mentioned that he wanted to extent his business in the project area and was eager to join the land-allocation project. Another farmer told he was decreasing his farm size and focused more on another, non-farming related, business and was not particularly fond of joining a land-allocation project. It can be argued that the formulation of a problem definition caused a multitude of reactions from involved stakeholders ranging from rejection towards acceptance of the problem definition phase and what this phase implied for the future. Interestingly enough this broad range of initial reaction clustered themselves around more general notions like: we oppose this problem definition and its associated developments, we are not interested in this problem definition and we fully support this problem definition. It appears that by clustering, each of the stakeholders tries to find support for his or her idea and thereby tries to reduce his or her uncertainty regarding a possible future situation. Each of these clusters formed their own trust-power dynamic whereby they put trust in their perspective towards the problem definition and exercised power to make their perspective prevalent. These clusters have its resemblance with the concept of discourse as defined by Foucault (1994). Wherein discourse is a collectively produced reality for a certain group of people, who hereby reject other collectively produced realities. Each of these clusters, or discourses, tried to influence the problem definition and let their ideas become the new reality. So the development of the problem definition resulted in a cluster of trust-power dynamics, partly based on stakeholders interpretation of the past, whereby it is possible, as in the case, that the conflicts between clusters are partially solved, through information exchange or discussion for example, which resulted in a focus point towards the future and thus the ability to move a project forward.

The previous paragraph described how contextual influences lead to a problem definition which in the case resulted in a range of clustered trust/power dynamics. Though next to contextual influences desires from involved stakeholders are related to the problem definition phase as well. A desire can be defined as to wish or long for something better. In the case study this desire manifested itself by the action of some local farmers to set forth a problem definition, with other words: they had a desire to change their current unsatisfactory situation. In the previous sentence the word 'change' has a major relevance. As for when there is no change, circumstances will not alter and what is desired for not reached. This notion of change leads back to the concepts of trust and power. Luhmann mentioned that power was about 'influencing the selection of actions in the face of other possibilities' (1979, p. 112). It can be argued that to achieve what one desires power has to be exercised in order to change certain circumstances in a more favorable matter when dependent on others, or for example, dependent on a planning process. It can be argued that trust influences the selection of actions as well when a stakeholder supports a certain claim or attitude for example towards the creation of a problem definition.

It can be argued that the problem definition in the project came into existence based on contextual influences and was formed through desire. When the problem definition was formed, each of the stakeholders in the project formed a unique perspective towards the formulated problem definition based on past experiences. Which indicates that past power exercises can

form or influence current trust power dynamics in the project. Resulting in clusters, or discourses, of realities aiming to make their specific perspective prevalent in the project, and thus exercise trust and power.

## **5.2 Development of trust and power towards the instrument generation phase**

One of the interviewees mentioned that before the start of the LDPR farmers had the freedom to decide whether they wanted to exchange plots or not. There was a level of self-determination and there was no overarching commission, which set out rules on how plots of land would be re-allocated in the future. This produced a situation where mainly personal trust was essential for a successful plot exchange. Or, to relapse on a definition of trust, a situation in which a trustor assumes that a trustee will behave in a specific positive way, now as well as in the future (Luhmann 1979). The exchange of plots prior to the land-use plan relied largely on a handshake according to one of the interviewees; hereby indicating that the intended plot exchange would be carried out. System trust and system power played a relative minor role in this phase. Several rules and policies were there to obey but the social interactions mostly relied on personal trust and personal resources of power. It is hard to retrieve this dynamic of trust and power prior to the land-use plan, however it can be argued that it has a certain resemblance with the British socio-economic system as described previously. It was argued that the absence of an institutional framework resulted in a lack of system trust. This lack resulted in a situation with a reliance on personal trust and an inclination to use individual resources of power to control the dynamics of their interaction (Bachmann 2002). How this dynamic exactly worked prior to the land-use plan is not retrieved from the case study. However it is likely that this dynamic of personal trust and power is regulated by a system of social rules to reduce uncertainty and risk; related to social pressure, trustworthiness and honor.

However, the dynamics of trust and power changed during the project. Gradually the project involved new mechanisms which structured and guided the project. For example the land-allocation law, the land-use commission in 1989 and the establishment of the land-allocation plan in 1999. Rules as well as a hierarchy were established to structure the project and prevent disorder. The development of system trust was possible through the established land-allocation plan and the land-allocation law. Stakeholders could start to form trust in these systems as it provided a constant framework to which the project would unfold in the future. New power-effects became present in the project as well. This presence manifested itself in the form of the land-allocation plan and the land-use law in how they set boundaries in the project and thus influencing the selection of actions in the face of other possibilities. As well as the power-effects exercised by the commissioners of the land-use commission to manage the stakes they represent and move the project forward. An example of these power-effects was displayed in one of the monthly consultation hours. One of the interviewees mentioned that farmers sometimes went to these consultation hours to see one of their wishes or desires realized. The job of the commission then was to present the perspective of a more common view and how those wishes or desires from the farmer could fit in. This often resulted for the farmer to adhere to the common view and alter their wishes and desires. By doing so his wishes and desires could fit in the overarching structure of policies, laws and general agreement on the desired developments. With other words, the commissioners exercised power so the wishes and desires of the farmer would not afflict the general regulations and plans in the face of other possibilities.

As the planning process became more complex an increased reliance on system trust and power-effects was needed to retain a manageable project. Preceding the land-use plan additional systems which supported trust and power interactions were not used as two or several farmers could arrange plot exchanges themselves. Though during the LDPR many stakes were involved. A multitude of developments were possible which gave rise to uncertainty and risk. The new structuring mechanisms and the power division between stakeholders and the land-use commission provided the possibility to diminish this risk and uncertainty. Without the presence of system trust or the possibility to exercise power-effects the project would become unmanageable. Without the ability to form system trust, consisting as a minimum of at least some general agreements, no one is able to understand where the project is heading. So in essence providing no reason to put trust in something as no clue is given on how this will help to reach their desires. In fact it can be argued that system trust provides the possibility to establish an ideology or vision for a project, which even indicates, in relation to the previous argument, that a complex process is not possible without at least a minimum amount of vision or ideology. This relates back to Webers (quoted in Giddens and Sutton 2009) definition of authority. He indicated that authority is a perceived positive legitimization of the actions of the powerful, by those who put trust in them, often related to some form of ideology. Hereby defining charismatic, traditional and rational-legal authority as the three variable forms. The elements in a planning process that make it possible to form system trust can thus be described as another form of authority. It can be defined as a socially constructed, non-personal reality, which represents at least some sort of vision or ideology, this makes it possible to develop system trust and can be defined as system authority. And thus combining the concept of rational-legal authority with Foucault's idea of a socially constructed reality. Arriving at the notion that a reality does not have to be related to a person or a certain law or regulation, but can be constructed as a mental conceptualization representing a certain vision or ideology in which people can develop trust.

It can be argued that the uncertainty in a complex process requires more complex social mechanisms to move a project forward effectively. This means that the complexity of a planning process is related to the way trust and power interact in that process. In this case the more complex the project got the larger reliance on system trust and the related system authority.

### **5.3 Calibration of trust and power in the instrument generation phase**

It can be argued that the goal of a stakeholder in a spatial planning process is to achieve a certain result that he or she desires, while at the same time take as little risk as possible to achieve this result. This means that an optimal planning process for a stakeholder consists of a predictable process which will lead him directly towards what he desires. Trust and power in this hypothetical situation would have a low dynamic, as the exercise of power throughout the project is predictable and the fluctuations in the trust-related aspects in the project are not necessary, as for it is already clear that the stakeholders desire will be reached. Stakeholders can have confidence in the project in this hypothetical situation. Though, perfect predictability is highly unlikely in an actual spatial planning project for new thoughts, policies or for example agricultural developments can influence the planning process. So the role of a stakeholder can be described as wanting to achieve something desired while taking minimum risk in a planning process which is unpredictable. In this field of tension trust and power play a certain role as analyzed below.

In the interviews for the case study it was mentioned that the goals and organization of the project changed several times. The land-use commission, for example, expanded in 2005 with four new members (Gedeputeerde Staten van Overijssel 2005). Another change in the project was the increasing inclusion of nature development in the project area. This implies that a certain amount of space is needed in the project area to develop natural qualities, which in turn results in a loss of farm grounds and possible restrictions due to nature conservation legislation. The possible loss of farm grounds resulted in an increased uncertainty for farmers and even an opposition to the idea to involve nature developments in the project. The effect these changes can have on the project became clear in the adjoining land-allocation plan Enter. In a newspaper article (displayed in appendix 1) it was stated that:

*'Fertile farm ground is converted to 'wet nature'; we are left with poor soils. Good land-allocation means progress. When farm grounds aren't divided in a useful way, the reallocation of land itself is not useful. We want to grow and not be hindered by nature.'*

In this example the particular stakeholder desires 'progress' but is uncertain if his plots will be converted to 'wet nature' or not. This uncertainty triggered a response from this stakeholder which puts the usefulness of the land-allocation plan into question. It appears that this stakeholder, at least temporary, lost trust in a satisfactory execution of the project. Interestingly his presumed diminished personal trust in the in the commission members and diminished system trust in the institutional aspects of the project resulted in an exercise of power from this stakeholder. He used his personal power by sharing his story in the newspaper which put pressure on the decision making processes of the land-use commission. Interestingly this exercise of power from the farmer has the ability to diminish the influence or power the land-use commission can exercise.

The power the land-use commission can exercise is dependent on the level of trust stakeholders grant this commission. Without stakeholders who actually put trust in their abilities their power is non-existent unless they can enforce it through for example fear or violence. This puts the land-use commission, although they have power, in an ever present state of vulnerability. This commission is vulnerable as a potential failure of the project, amongst others, can put a social pressure on them as they didn't fulfill their promises. So an expression of personal power against the project has to be handled carefully for it is uncertain how this expression affects the minds of other stakeholders and might undermine their position of power. Because of this vulnerable position the commission for example apologized for decisions they made, convinced stakeholders that they actually made a valid decision and showed their good intentions for the project throughout several phases of the project. Overall it can be said that if the uncertainty about reaching their desire is decreased, as threatened by new developments, stakeholders are more likely to restore their trust in the powerful and the associated project process. An example of decreased uncertainty for stakeholders by the land-use commission is showed in the newspaper article in appendix one. In this article it is stated that a couple of farmers, united under the name Team Ypelo, developed an alternative for the land-use plan Enter. The secretary of the land-use commission reacted to this by saying that: 'When this plan is useful for all stakeholder, who are we not to put this plan into practice?'" The secretary is showing goodwill to indicate that they represent the goals and common stakes of the project. In other words, it is possible that the vulnerability of the land-use commission caused them to partly comply to the

exercise of power, the alternative land-use plan, to avoid losing power and to try to gain trust from these stakeholders. So it can be argued that through vulnerability trust can influence the exercise of power in a project. This of course nicely indicates a form of interdependence between trust and power. Whereby trust influences power-effects and trust even can be viewed as a form of power. This of course raises the question what can be defined as the difference between trust and power and if both concepts have an inextricable interdependency. Or if there is a grey, still undefined, area which connects both concepts. Besides it can be argued as well that having power requires trust as well. For power is socially constructed and merely functions on the assumption that this power, or authority, is granted to them by people who assumedly put trust in them.

Another interesting point to notice is that distrust did not cause a breakdown of the project; rather the project kept moving forward and now nears completion. This means that the levels of trust and power were restored to an at least reasonable level in the project. For without power this project would be ruled by disorder and without trust 'everything would have to be verified, guaranteed or enforced' (Wittgenstein 1969, p. 135). To understand why this restoration took place we need to look at how unexpected events influence the behavior of stakeholders. One can argue that as a departure point in a spatial planning process there is a certain balance between trust and power. This balance, amongst others, is formed through desired from the different stakeholders in the project and the associated risk taking. Though as new, sometimes unexpected influences or desires enter the planning process this former balance of trust and power is disturbed. A new field of desires and associated risk taking enters the project; either resulting in the desire of current stakeholders to form a new balance between trust and power or in the desire to leave the project on the basis of distrust in the continuation of the project. One of the unexpected influences in the case was the expansion of the land-use commission with four new members in 2005 (Gedeputeerde Staten van Overijssel 2005). As new stakes had to be taken into account this caused a temporary disturbance of the trust / power relations in the project. The trust of farmers in the commission and the institutional arrangement of the project decreased. As a result of this the power of the commission decreased as well as the farmers became less receptive to the ideas and influences of the commission. One of the interviewees mentioned that the alteration of an apparent fixed composition of the commission caused a period of caution and uncertainty for some of the involved stakeholders. The 'solution' to this specific disturbance possibly came from the vulnerability of the land-use commission as they gave an excessive explanation to why this expansion was necessary. In the case this explanation, and a re-affirmation of the project goals, apparently led to a restored balance of trust and power. It is plausible that this restoration of trust is more likely when there is some of system trust or personal trust based on past experiences present which solidifies trustworthiness. Distrust is arguably achieved the other way around. It represents a situation in which a stakeholder does not believe his desire can be reached or his uncertainty decreased. Although distrust can probably be temporary as well. This was possibly the case in the newspaper article formed by strong emotions.

Overall it can be said that the restoration of trust and power is achieved through the desire of a stakeholder to achieve their goals, unless it becomes impossible for this stakeholder to see his desire achieved. Trust and power in this give the dynamic to let outside influences enter the project process. The powerful can prove their trustworthiness through several means like re-affirming the project goals or explain why new influences are necessary to enter the project. The

vulnerable position of the powerful, as their power only exists by the people who put trust in them, helps to keep them in line with project goals as for they don't want to fail the project, because of for example social pressure, they have to keep the trustees faithful as for without their support this power of the powerful would cease to exist. The trustees in this have the personal power to challenge the actions of the powerful and hereby alter the trust/power dynamics. Hereby fading the theoretical clear-cut boundaries between the concepts of trust and power.

#### **5.4 Absence of trust and power between the instrument generation and implementation phase**

During the interviews for the case study it became clear that the answers given by the respondents did not fully cover all of the general planning phases as described in the theoretical framework. There especially is a lack of information regarding trust and power between the instrument generation and implementation phase. One of the interviewees stated that: "Only when a certain part of the project is set do stakeholders react and use their particular power to create a more satisfactory situation that suits their interest". This statement underscores the idea that only when a decision is made, or power is exercised, does this result in a reaction from stakeholders. It is likely that during moments of decision making trust and power have a large dynamic. The inclusion of nature for example was a large exercise of power which contrasted with some stakeholders future perspectives of the project and thus causing fluctuations in the levels of trust. Though outside these moments of decision making trust and power appear to have a different dynamic.

First of all trust and power did not completely disappear between the instrument generation and implementation phase. One of the interviewees mentioned that the levels of trust and power did not fluctuate much between these phases. It can be argued that the land-use plan and the land-allocation plan were still functional and thus still influence the project. However as none of the stakeholders experienced the boundaries of these plans, as they were merely awaiting the next step in the project, it is hard to argue that trust and power were influencing the project. So a more careful way to describe the functioning of trust and power between the two phases is that an image of this dynamic is memorized and is called upon when for example new decisions are made in the next phase.

Previously it was argued that an interpretation of the past can influence future behavior. It is likely that a context outside the LDPR project can influence the perception towards the project itself. For example a farmer in the project area can win the lottery, which reduces his necessity for a financial sound farm and thus changes his attitude towards the LDPR. Hypothetically speaking, as this change in perception was not noticed in the case study, it is possible that the trust/power dynamic before and after a time without this dynamic has changed. So a changed perception of the project, formed through new influences or knowledge, can hypothetically lead towards a changed trust/power dynamic during periods where this dynamic is not actively present.

## 5.5 Restriction of power-effects throughout the project

As an exercise of power can influence a project it can be a major source of risk and uncertainty in a spatial planning process. In the case study several mechanisms were at work which limited the execution of power in the project and thus decreased uncertainty and risk taking as the project became more predictable. One of the most obvious limiting mechanisms in the case is formed by the land-allocation law. This law describes the specific rights and duties of stakeholders. The law includes for example a description of the obligatory steps that need to be taken in the re-parcelling projects. It offers the possibility as well for stakeholders to appeal towards decisions in the project. When a stakeholder has a conflicting view in most cases he has the possibility to take legal actions. So the land-allocation law can be viewed as a limiting and enabling mechanism as it functions as a regulation were two or more parties have agreed upon. The law helps to reduce the risk a stakeholder needs to bear in the process in a certain way as it is in his power to question the justice of a decision and take subsequent action. The land-use commission on the other hand, or those who exercise power, receive more pressure to act responsible as every irresponsible behavior can be questioned by a stakeholder. So the land-allocation law is one of the mechanisms which regulates the exercise of power in the project and hereby decreases uncertainty and risk taking. Though there are other, less obvious, mechanisms as well which limit the exercise of power. One of the interviewees stated that the amount of trust towards commissioners was large towards those who lived in the project area. This can be explained by the social responsibility those commissioners had towards friends, family and colleague farmers living in the project area and those commissioners would receive personal benefits towards their farms and houses when the plan was executed in a desirable way. From another perspective this meant that when the commissioners use their power unwisely they would receive negative social feedback from friends and family. As this would be an undesired consequence for the commissioner the stakeholder knew that it was likely that the commissioner would restrain from this behavior. Because of this the stakeholders could put more trust in these commissioners and the uncertainty in the project decreased. Another example is that each of the commissioners represented a certain group of stakeholders in the project. Each of the decisions they made was monitored by the stakeholders they represented. So the power of these commissioners was virtually limited by the wishes and desires from the stakeholders they represented. Yet another mechanism is formed by the fact that all commissioners are formally equal to each other. Only through discussion and concession decisions can be made. This meant that none of the commissioners had the perceived power to change or make a decision on his own; they are interdependent.

These examples of limiting mechanisms can be seen as formed by the ongoing desire to decrease uncertainty and risk in a project. These mechanism can even be seen as representing a fertile basis on which system trust can grow. Interestingly do these mechanisms have their limitations as well. As the more limiting mechanisms influence a project the more static it becomes as described below. The increasing of limiting mechanisms at a certain moment can conflict with the changing context which influences the project at a certain moment. In the case this for example happened when the subject of nature was included in the process including its representatives. Suddenly new regulations were needed as well as new concessions. Old regulations were discarded or altered. These concessions could only be reached when the new desires of nature representatives were included in the project. This temporarily resulted in a situation of higher uncertainty according to one of the interviewees. So even the restriction of

power-effects, which decreases uncertainty in a project, has a certain dynamic too: a too strict regulation of power-effects can be broken down when new circumstances enter the project. This new circumstances and regulations had a large effect on the stakeholders in the project. Especially, as indicated by the interviewees, that they did not expect regulations or the commission to change; they had put system trust into these. System trust in this functions as a source of stability that can be expected to be broken down in order to achieve progress in the project and hereby affecting personal trust and the power-effects that are exercised in the project. System trust, and of course the related system authority, is perceptive to change throughout the project. This means that the dynamic of a planning process is inherently related to changing perceptions of trust, power and authority from stakeholders.

### **5.6 Dissolving of trust and power in the implementation phase**

As a project comes to an end so must the levels of trust and power that are connected to this project. Although the project in the case study is not finished yet the activity in the project is slowing down as more and more parts of the project are completed. This slowing down can be seen since the implementation of the first sub-projects in the year 2000. After the completion of each of the sub-projects the binding power structures derived from the land-use plan and the land-allocation plan fall away. Besides the land-use commission has no longer a substantial interest in the project and the commission removes its influence from the area, including its power-effects as well as the trust they received from the stakeholders. The finished sub-projects, however, still influence the LDPR process and other contexts of relations and perspectives as well outside the project. By developing the sub-projects one by one knowledge was gained on how to effectively carry out the other sub-projects. This offered stakeholders from other sub-projects clarity on how their area would develop. According to one of the interviewees this resulted in an increased sense of trust from the stakeholders. Friends and family from completed sub-projects were able to tell them what they could expect in their project area. This meant that stakeholders had an increased certainty about the future which changed their perception of the risk they needed to bear as well as their sense of trust. Though the power of the land-use commission was not lost either. One of the farmers indicated that after this sub-project was satisfactory completed he still would adhere to advise from any of the commission members. This relates back to the issue of authority which was defined as a perceived positive legitimization of a trustees power from the trustors point of view. So based on an image from the past, the successful completion of a sub-project, the ability to influence people, or the exercise of power, can continue into the future. This means that, just as trust and power are already present during the start of a project, the specific trust / power structures continue to influence new contexts of relations and perspectives outside the actual project.

## **6. Conclusion**

This study started by questioning how the interrelation between the concepts of trust and power influence the evolution of a spatial planning process. To understand this interrelation and influence on a planning process several research questions were stated which are answered below.

### **How can the interrelation between trust and power in a spatial planning process be conceptualized?**

The studied literature revealed that trust and power are defined in different ways which makes it hard to understand how both concepts interrelate. Several authors have attempted to describe the interrelation between trust and power (Verkerk 2004, Bachmann 2002 and Inkpen and Currall 1997), however a structural vehicle to do so lacks, which can create confusion on how the interrelation between trust and power functions. With the help of the reviewed literature a conceptual framework was created to understand the interrelation between trust and power. The range of trust and power definitions presented in the literature review were distilled to three main concepts: personal trust, system trust and power-effects. Together they form the so-called trust/power-triangle and hereby present a way to conceptualize the interrelation between trust and power.

### **How does this conceptualization influence the perception on a planning process?**

The conceptual framework of the trust-power triangle was used to analyze the case study. Although this conceptual framework was useful as an instrument to study the case study, it also indicated its limited applicability. This limited applicability showed as it was not exactly clear how trust differs from power. It was argued that the powerful rely on trustors, for without their trust the power of the powerful does not exist. The previous statement already indicates that trustors have the ability to influence the powerful. This indicates that trust and power are not two separate entities, but might descend from a still undefined overarching conceptualization which more accurately describes the functionalities of both concepts. Describing trust and power as separate entities provides a limitation on the way both concepts can be understood; it influences the perspective from which both concepts can be viewed. This means that the current understanding of trust and power, although useful, provides a distorted view on its functioning. Thus a more integral approach towards understanding trust and power provides the possibility for a more accurate description of its functionalities. From a broader perspective it can be argued that, if it is one's goal to unravel the complexities of social interactions, one has to ultimately understand how social mechanisms influence each other, and not merely study these mechanisms as separate entities. The definition of triangular conceptualizations like the trust/power-triangle hereby provides the possibility to link and express interrelations between social mechanisms and build a 'blueprint' of the functioning of social interactions.

### **How does this conceptualization influence a spatial planning process?**

Next to the question how trust and power can be conceptualized this study focused on how trust, power and its interaction can affect a planning process. The first analysis point gave the insight that the problem definition phase can be viewed as a junction where different trust-

power dynamics meet. It was analyzed that the problem definition came into existence based on contextual influences and desires. This caused multiple clusters of reality, or discourses, to appear in relation to this definition. Stakeholders each formed a unique interpretation of past experiences and contextual influences and hereby supported a certain reality. So the interpretation of past experiences of stakeholders resulted in certain realities, or discourses, which stakeholders supported or put trust in. At the same time does this trust in a discourse result in a source of power as by trusting this discourse the desire is expressed to make this specific discourse prevalent in the project. Indicating again that trust and power cannot be viewed as separate entities. Indicating as well that trust and power can function as a selection mechanism which can define the prevalent problem definition, and resulting from that, the definition of a project goal. This results in the idea that defining a problem, or making a decision in general, is a result from trust/power dynamics and forms a source for creating trust/power dynamics as well. A planning process is thus under a constant influence of trust/power dynamics.

Later on in the analysis it was observed that rules and regulations, in which one can form system trust, has its own dynamic. An increase in rules and institutions makes a project's process more static and less uncertain, for power-effects in the project are restricted, though new influences can enter the project and affect these rules, resulting in a decreased system trust. So system trust forms a source of stability to achieve progress, though new influences affect this system trust and hereby affecting personal trust and power-effects as well. This dynamic stability however does not guarantee flawless social interactions in a planning process. It was argued that when a stakeholder does not believe his desires can be achieved or his uncertainty decreased, distrust can form, which can possibly lead to a disintegration of the project. As it was in the interest of the land-use commission that the levels of trust were restored, the land-use commission had a certain sense of vulnerability. For without people who put trust in their abilities their power is non-existent. The vulnerability of those in a powerful position makes it possible for trustors to influence the exercise of power in a project as well as the rules and institutions which makes it possible to form system trust. This means that the vulnerable position of a trustor in relation to the powerful is less vulnerable than indicated in the studied literature. The leap of faith from the trustors point of view (Kumar and Paddison 2000), its vulnerability (Nooteboom 2002) and the related risk taking (Bachmann 2000) are, according to this study, more nuanced than currently presented in literature.

One noticeable dynamic of trust and power revolved around moments of decision making. For it was noticed that trust and power dynamics were especially large during moments of decision making. A reason for this is that decisions limit future possibilities. This means that decisions reduce the chance that a stakeholder's discourse becomes the prevalent reality. So moments of decision making forms a source of risk taking from the stakeholder's point of view. The adjoining uncertainty regarding the making of a decision can put pressure on stakeholders as a decision has the potential to affect one's life situation for example. In this sense it can be expected that stakeholder's perception of trust/power dynamics in a project alters. A stakeholder's dependence on a decision alters the way he or she trusts other persons or exercises his own power to influence a decision. It was noticed as well that trust-power dynamics alter during periods where no decisions are made as stakeholder's perception towards the project changes. This perception changes as well because of expectations towards the future and the accessory promises. Moments without decision making creates an apparent reality that trust/power dynamics are not likely to alter.

The complexity of a project forms an indication to what forms of trust and power are likely to be present. An increased number of stakeholders indicated an increased reliance on system trust. The definition of rules helped to decrease uncertainty in the project. System trust, in this sense, can be seen as a way to manage expectations. In order to deal with complex situations abstract systems are created to provide a project a certain identity. One of these systems is the creation of system authority; or a shared supported perspective towards a desired future ideological situation. The ideological properties of system trust raises the question if other imaginative systems can be thought of to provide new realities which can serve as a supporting tool which provides the possibility to approach a more satisfactory trust/power dynamic in a project and hereby reducing risk and uncertainty for involved stakeholders. An increased reliance on system trust, however, means that a project becomes more static and less uncertain. New contextual influences however can influence the project and require an alteration of the systems where the current system trust is based upon. System trust form a source of stability in a project, however new influences can affect this system trust and hereby affect personal trust and power-effects as well.

The case study analysis gave rise to the idea that to make a planning process successful the trust/power dynamic that is created in the project should be matched to the already present trust/power dynamic in the project area. For stakeholders are not only already used to this current dynamic, but it provides the possibility as well to build more complex dynamics, like system trust, upon this already existing trust/power dynamic.

Concluding it can be said that the concepts of trust and power have a dynamic interrelation with recognizable patterns throughout a spatial planning process. Trust and power at the start of the project are already present and at the end of the process will influence outside contexts. Trust and power dynamics are especially large during moments of decision making as showed throughout the case study. However during moments without decision making the levels of trust and power still fluctuate as perceptions towards the project change. This study showed that the aspects of the trust-power triangle are interrelated and hereby prevent extreme fluctuations of the aspects themselves and thus offer the opportunity to move a project forward. System trust provided certainty but also limitations for the trustor and those who exercise power. Though this certainty could be overruled by those who can exercise power as new influences must enter the project. As well as by trustors who can utilize the vulnerable position of the powerful. From this perspective the trust and power dynamic, as represented in the triangle, can be seen as forming resilience to move a project forward; each of the aspects of the triangle has the ability to rearrange an unfavorable fluctuation of another aspect to a more favorable one. Whereby decision making, or social interactions in general, form a source and at the same time a result of trust/power-dynamics.

## 6.1 Recommendations

In planning practice it is uncommon to analyze how social dynamics might affect the execution of a communicative planning process. An understanding of these dynamics, however, may be of use to achieve a more thorough understanding on how these communicative processes work. Below some recommendations are presented for application in a planning process.

- It is recommended that spatial planners develop an awareness about how the size and timing of decision making can influence the relational aspects between trust and power and thus the project process.
- An awareness towards stakeholders reliance on system trust and the dynamic properties system trust has. As new influences enter the process present system trust and the perceived system authority can change. An overreliance on this systems from the stakeholders point of view is undesirable.
- A planner in a planning process is in a vulnerable position. As the trust people have in you is not absolute, they can lose that trust and the planner his position of power. This affects the influence the planner can have in a planning project.
- Moments without decision making can influence the dynamic of trust and power in a planning project. This makes it sensible to stay in touch with stakeholders during phases without decision making or fluctuating trust/power dynamics.

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## **Appendixes**

Appendix 1: Newspaper Article

Appendix 2: Interview Questions Experts

Appendix 3: Interview Questions Case-study

## APPENDIX 1: NEWSPAPER ARTICLE

'We can do better without the land allocation project.'

ENTER/YPELO – A few farmers in Ypelo are unhappy about the design for the land use reallocation project in Enter and united in Team Ypelo. According to them does the land use commission insufficiently take into account the future perspective of farmers, and aims to much, with 150 hectares of new nature, on the development of nature.

According to contractor Bertjan ter Steege, who represents Team Ypelo, is the whole commission to much focused on plan which aim to develop nature and recreation. "It is sad that healthy farms are heavily hurt by the land use commission Enter. So badly that some farmers are depressed. The commission knows about these problems, but doesn't cooperate to solve the problems. Team Ypelo has, in reaction to the plans of the land use commission, developed an alternative plan, in which the opinion of Team Ypelo and the wishes of farmers are integrated. "It has been a few months ago since we submitted the plan, but we received no reaction so far". According to Ter Steege would the farmers be more happy when the land use plans are cancelled. "Fertile farmground is converted to 'wet nature' ; we are left with poor soils. Good land allocation means progress. When farmground isn't divided in a usefull way, the reallocation of land itself is not useful. We want to grow and not be hindered by nature."

Wim Tijink, secretary of the land use commission, realises that reallocation involves emotions. "It touches me when land owners can't sleep because of the land allocation. But, administratively, we can't be led by emotions. We have to treat land owners equally". Tijink has viewed the alternative plan of team Ypelo, but does not have an overview of the consequences for the whole project area. "When this plan is useful for all stakeholders, who are we to not put this plan into practice?" Tijink regrets the image that the commission doesn't take the wishes of farmers into account. "We have to obey the land use law; we have to take into account the whole community, not just the farmers."

## Appendix 2: INTERVIEW QUESTIONS EXPERTS

### Algemeen

1. Kunt u een korte beschrijving welk werk u doet?
  - a. Op wat voor een manier bent u betrokken bij projecten?
  - b. Waarom wordt u betrokken bij projecten, vanwege welke kennis?
  - c. Welke rol heeft u in een project? (bijv. neutraal, projectleider of adviseur?)

### Proces

2. Een goed proces is vaak cruciaal voor het welslagen van een project. Wat zijn volgens u punten in het proces die er voor zorgen dat een project goed verloopt? Gebaseerd op communicatie.
3. Welke punten in een proces zorgen ervoor dat een project slecht loopt? Wat zijn de meest gemaakte fouten? Gebaseerd op communicatie.

### Invloed

In een planningsproces is er altijd sprake van een bepaalde invloed. Een projectleider heeft vaak redelijk veel invloed, terwijl burgers juist vaak minder invloed hebben.

4. Wat vindt u ervan dat rollen die partijen hebben in een project duidelijk verdeelt worden? M.a.w. het staat vast wie wat gaat doen en hoeveel invloed ze krijgen in het proces.
  - a. Is deze invloed statisch of verandert deze in de loop van het proces?
5. In hoeverre moet een proces volgens u flexibel zijn? Beleid/regels/contracten.
  - a. Denkt u dat de mate van flexibiliteit invloed heeft op het vertrouwen in het project?

### Vertrouwen

Een ander aspect dat in een planningsproces aanwezig is, is vertrouwen. Net als invloed is vertrouwen een mechanisme dat je omgang met anderen beïnvloed.

6. Heeft u projecten meegemaakt waar volgens u een vermindert vertrouwen was in het welslagen van het project?
  - a. Wanneer er een vermindert vertrouwen is binnen een samenwerking, wat gebeurt er dan volgens u? Blijven mensen met hun problemen zitten, zoeken ze de confrontatie of via de rechter?
7. Kun je aangeven welke factoren een rol spelen in het opbouwen van vertrouwen binnen een project? Denk aan een prettige samenwerking / contracten etc.
  - a. Waarom spelen deze factoren een rol of juist niet?
  - b. Kun je hiervan een voorbeeld geven?

### **Invloed en vertrouwen**

Er is vaak beweerd dat macht en vertrouwen op verschillende manieren met elkaar verbonden zijn. De hoeveelheid macht die je hebt, of de hoeveelheid macht die op je uitgeoefend wordt zou een positieve of juist negatieve invloed hebben op het vertrouwen dat mensen hebben.

8. Stel je voor dat participanten in een project meer invloed krijgen in het proces. Op welke manier beïnvloedt dit volgens u het vertrouwen in het project?
  - a. Kunt u hier een voorbeeld van noemen?
  - b. Waarom zou uw vertrouwen toenemen of afnemen; wat zijn de belangrijkste factoren?
  
9. Beleid, contracten en afspraken geven vaak sturing aan een project. Wat is de invloed van deze afspraken op uw verwachtingen van het project?
  - a. Wat vindt u van deze afspraken?
  - b. Zijn het beleid/contracten/afspraken veranderd gedurende het proces?
  - c. Wat vond u hiervan?
  - d. Hoe beïnvloedde dit uw vertrouwen in het project?
  - e. Wat heeft uw voorkeur: een proces waarin alles vastgelegd is in regels of een proces waarbij de toekomst onzeker is maar waarbij u nog wel invloed kunt uitoefenen? En waarom?
  
10. Wat vindt u van Collaborative planning in het Nederlands planningssysteem? Samenwerking op basis van gelijkwaardigheid, is dit haalbaar? Wat zijn volgens u kansen of belemmeringen?

## APPENDIX 3: INTERVIEW QUESTIONS CASE STUDY

### Interview vragen

#### Algemeen

1. Kunt u een korte beschrijving geven van het project?
  - a. Op wat voor een manier bent u betrokken bij het project? Wat is uw rol in het project?
  - b. Waarom bent u betrokken bij het project?
  - c. Vanaf wanneer was u betrokken bij het project?
  - d. In hoeverre is dit in overeenstemming met afspraken die gemaakt zijn aan het begin van het project?
  - e. Wat is het huidige einddoel van het project? Waar wordt naartoe gewerkt?

#### Proces

2. Dit project is gestart in .... Hoe is het project begonnen en wie kreeg welke taken?
  - a. Welke personen/instanties zijn betrokken bij het project?
  - b. In hoeverre is duidelijk gemaakt wie welke taken kreeg en hoeveel invloed betrokkenen zouden hebben aan het begin van het project?
  - c. Was je tevreden met deze taakverdeling? Waarom?
  - d. Hoeveel invloed kon je zelf uitoefenen in het proces?
  - e. Kreeg je een bepaalde hoeveelheid invloed toegewezen? Of nam je aan dat je een bepaalde hoeveelheid invloed toegewezen zou krijgen?
  - f. Welk doel is oorspronkelijk gesteld en hoeveel is hier vanaf geweken (einddatum/einddoelen)?
  - g. Wat vond u hiervan?
3. In welke fase van het proces zit je nu?
  - a. Hoe verloopt de samenwerking tussen de partijen?
  - b. Beoordeelt u de manier van samenwerken positief of negatief en waarom?
  - c. Is de samenwerking in het proces verbeterd of verslechterd, wat was hiervan de oorzaak denkt u?
  - d. Wat had er anders moeten gebeuren, volgens u, zodat de samenwerking niet verslechterd/verbeterd was?
  - e. Hoe verwacht je dat het proces / samenwerking verder gaat verlopen?
  - f. Verwacht je voor u een goed eindresultaat of niet?

#### Invloed

In een planningsproces is er altijd sprake van een bepaalde invloed. Een projectleider heeft vaak redelijk veel invloed, terwijl burgers juist vaak minder invloed hebben.

4. Wie kreeg officieel invloed toegewezen aan het begin van het project en wie niet?
  - a. Is deze invloed veranderd in de loop van het proces? Wanneer deze invloed veranderd is, wat vindt u daarvan en hoe komt dit?

- b. Wie nam de beslissingen in dit project en wie neemt ze nu?
  - c. Is het voor u mogelijk in het proces om druk uit te oefenen op genomen beslissingen? Heeft u inbreng of wordt er aandacht geschonken aan uw inbreng?
  - d. Wanneer u een grotere invloed zou kunnen uitoefenen op het project, zou uw vertrouwen in het project dan toenemen en waarom?
5. In hoeverre geven beleid/contracten/afspraken sturing aan het project?
- a. In hoeverre ligt het proces al vast? Hoe flexibel is het project?
  - b. Geeft dit u vertrouwen in het project of juist niet?
  - c. In hoeverre heeft bestaand beleid invloed op het project?
  - d. Geeft dit u vertrouwen in het project of juist niet?

### **Vertrouwen**

Een ander aspect dat in een planningsproces aanwezig is, is vertrouwen. Net als invloed is vertrouwen een mechanisme dat je omgang met anderen beïnvloed.

6. Wat vindt u van de samenwerking binnen het project?
- a. Heeft u de behoefte om constant 'te waken' over het project en het proces of niet?
  - b. Is deze behoefte verandert gedurende het proces en waarom?
  - c. In hoeverre bestaat er een vrijheid tot discussie binnen het project?
  - d. In hoeverre heeft u een helder beeld van wat er in de toekomst gaat gebeuren?
  - e. Wat vertroebeld of verhelderd dit beeld en waarom?
7. Kun je aangeven in hoeverre je betrokken instanties/personen iets zou toevertrouwen?
- a. Waarom zou je deze instantie iets toevertrouwen of waarom juist niet?
  - b. Welke factoren spelen hierin een rol? Wat zou er moeten veranderen om dit te verbeteren?
8. Waren er specifieke momenten waren je een persoon of instantie juist meer of minder vertrouwd, en kun je aangeven waarom dit veranderde; wat was de oorzaak hiervan?

### **Invloed en vertrouwen**

Er is vaak beweerd dat macht en vertrouwen op verschillende manieren met elkaar verbonden zijn. De hoeveelheid macht die je hebt, of de hoeveelheid macht die op je uitgeoefend wordt zou een positieve of juist negatieve invloed hebben op het vertrouwen dat mensen hebben.

9. Zou uw vertrouwen in het project en andere partijen verbeteren, verslechteren of neutraal blijven wanneer u meer invloed zou kunnen uitoefenen binnen het project?
- a. Kunt u hier een voorbeeld van noemen?

- b. Waarom zou uw vertrouwen toenemen of afnemen; wat zijn de belangrijkste factoren?
10. Beleid, contracten en afspraken geven vaak sturing aan een project. Wat is de invloed van deze afspraken op uw verwachtingen van het project?
- a. Wat vindt u van deze afspraken?
  - b. Zijn het beleid/contracten/afspraken veranderd gedurende het proces?
  - c. Wat vond u hiervan?
  - d. Hoe beïnvloedde dit uw vertrouwen in het project?
  - e. Wat heeft uw voorkeur: een proces waarin alles vastgelegd is in regels of een proces waarbij de toekomst onzeker is maar waarbij u nog wel invloed kunt uitoefenen? En waarom?